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Abstract 
Extraordinary amounts of public funds and/or assistance were made available to banks 
since the onset of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Governments worldwide have 
launched a massive bailout package to support banks in distress. Using a probit model, 
this paper investigates the likelihood of bailouts following the financial crisis. Our 
results lead us to conclude that the governance characteristics of banks, specifically the 
characteristics of boards, bank risks, as well as bank-level and country-specific banking 
sector features, explain the likelihood of bailouts in the European banking sector. In 
particular we find that board banking experience, longer directors’ tenure, less busy 
boards and the existence of a corporate governance committee decrease the likelihood 
of banks participating in a bailout programme. Inversely, board independence, credit 
and liquidity risks increase the probability of banks being bailed out. Furthermore, 
fewer limitations on banking freedom and greater openness of the banking sector have a 
harmful impact on the occurrence of bailouts. Our study therefore suggests relevant 
policy implications, which might help supervisors, regulators and other public 
authorities in avoiding costly bailouts. 
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1. Introduction  
The global financial crisis, starting in 2007, generated numerous public 
interventions into banking systems. Given that the failure of many banks was imminent, 
governments all over the world enacted a variety of rescue plans to prevent wide scale 
financial collapse. Among the many means of government intervention were: (1) direct 
equity injections, providing liquidity support to banks, (2) government guaranteed debt 
issuance programmes and the issuance of guarantees to reassure depositors and 
(3) purchases of distressed assets by the government or, more generally, the provision 
of mechanisms to relieve financial institutions from impaired or “toxic” assets.1 Most of 
the government bailout programmes were a mix of distinct means of government 
interventions. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the United States (US) 
was a mix of equity injections and distressed asset purchases, while most of the 
European bailout programmes combined government guaranteed debt issuance 
programmes with direct equity injections.2 More specifically, in the European Union 
(EU) most member states provided general guarantees for the whole banking system as 
well as support for the weakest banks, through guarantees on bank liabilities, capital 
injections, impaired asset relief and funding support. State aid to the banking system in 
each member state had to be notified to - and approved by - the European 
Commission’s Directorate General for Competition, which aims to ensure that the 
measures do not distort competition. Since October 2008 hundreds of decisions 
authorising State aid measures were taken. The bulk of this aid represented guarantees 
on liabilities, with recapitalisations being the second most used support instrument.3 
Support measures have commonly been accompanied by restrictions on dividend 
payments and on executive compensation, requirements for regular reporting on 
banking activity developments, government participation in the management of banks 
and restructuring requirements. 
                                                 
1 Bastian Breitenfellner and Niklas Wagner, ‘Government Intervention in Response to the Subprime 
Financial Crisis: The Good into the Pot, the Bad into the Crop’, 19 International Review of Financial 
Analysis 289 (2010). Emiliano Grossman and Cornelia Woll, ‘Saving the Banks: The Political Economy 
of Bailouts’, 47 Comparative Political Studies 574 (2014). 
2 Bastian Breitenfellner and Niklas Wagner, ‘Government Intervention in Response to the Subprime 
Financial Crisis: The Good into the Pot, the Bad into the Crop’, 19 International Review of Financial 
Analysis 289 (2010). 
3 For detailed information see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/financial_economic_crisis_aid_en.html (visited 4 
Mar 2014) 
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Based on much of the policy literature on banking crisis, we would expect a larger 
amount of bailouts whenever the banking sector has a relevant position in the economy. 
In particular, as the size of the banking sector become larger, the need for government 
intervention will become more intense.4 Thus, the significance of the banking system 
for the financing of the economy (e.g., the dependence of firms on funding provided by 
banks) is likely to play a role, urging governments to intervene. Accordingly, variation 
in policy responses might be a function of economic issues, where the government has 
little choice but to intervene once the crisis has erupted. Moreover, a concentrated 
banking sector will have more lobbying resources and is more likely to have access to 
the government than a very dispersed one.5  
Also, in countries “bank-financed”, where capital access depends on the bank credit, 
bankers and entrepreneurs tend to have personal relationships, with tight connections 
with the the government. Therefore, one might expect that close connections between 
the banking sector and the government (or, in other words, between bankers and 
members of the government) would impact on the occurrence of bailouts. The closer 
their relations the more likely are bailouts.  
Additionally, if politicians do have some discretion when designing bailout plans, 
we should see variation across countries according to political factors.6 The political 
ideology of government might make a difference. Traditionally, conservative parties are 
assumed to have closer relationships with the banking sector and financial interests, 
while left governments should be concerned about the redistributive effects of bank 
rescues.7 Also, countries with a liberal market tradition should refrain from extensive 
government aid, while more interventionist countries should be more proactive.8 
When banks have very serious financial problems, solving them will imply, very 
often, the need for bailouts, which are extremely costly. The enormous magnitude of the 
                                                 
4 Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, ‘Resolution of Banking Crises: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly’, 
IMF Working Paper No. 10/146, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres_gsause.aspx?sk=23971&gsa=true (visited 10 April 2014) 
(2010). 
5 Emiliano Grossman and Cornelia Woll, ‘Saving the Banks: The Political Economy of Bailouts’, 47 
Comparative Political Studies 574 (2014). 
6 Ibid. 
7 John W. Cioffi and Martin Höpner, ‘The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, 
and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform’, 34 Politics and Society 463 (2006). 
8 Emiliano Grossman and Cornelia Woll, ‘Saving the Banks: The Political Economy of Bailouts’, 47 
Comparative Political Studies 574 (2014). 
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global financial crisis, illustrated by the unparalleled volume of government support 
packages for the financial system, has highlighted the need for a clear identification of 
the determinants of bailouts in the banking sector. However, the literature lacks a deep 
and detailed analysis of the factors that determine bailouts in the context of the financial 
crisis.  
The aim of this paper is to fill this gap. Unlike previous studies that focus on the 
likelihood of financial distress or bankruptcy, which raises the question of defining the 
requirements, not always consensual, for a firm to be considered in financial distress9 or 
in bankruptcy, in this study, we focus on bailouts, that can be considered a specific 
status in the firm’s life, in the crisis context. So, our sample consists of banks which 
received government assistance, due to their critical financial distress status, in order to 
avoid the stage of bankruptcy. Substantial financial distress effects are incurred well 
prior to default 10 and to bailouts. Eliezer M. Fich and Steve L. Slezak11 identify the 
various aspects of a firm’s governance structure that affect the probability and the 
predictability of bankruptcy once the firm has entered the state of financial distress. 
Overall, their findings indicate that governance characteristics are associated with the 
likelihood that financially distressed firms become bankrupt. Also, some other studies 
have found a significant relationship between a set of corporate governance attributes 
and the financial distress of firms, such as Fathi Elloumi and Jean-Pierre Gueyié for 
Canadian firms,12 Tsun-Siou Lee and Yin-Hua for Taiwanese firms,13 Shamsul Nahar 
Abdullah for Malaysian firms14 and Seema Miglani, Kamran Ahmed and Darren Henry 
for Australian firms.15 However, the literature that analyses the determinants of the 
                                                 
9 “Different countries have different accounting procedures and rules, and the definition of financial 
distress put forward by different scholars is not always the same” (Ruibin Geng, Indranil Bose and Xi 
Chen, ‘Prediction of Financial Distress: An Empirical Study of Listed Chinese Companies Using Data 
Mining’, 241 European Journal of Operational Research 236 (2005), at 236). 
10 Fathi Elloumi and Jean-Pierre Gueyié, ‘Financial Distress and Corporate Governance: An Empirical 
Analysis’, 1 Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 15 (2001). 
11  Eliezer M. Fich and Steve L. Slezak, ‘Can Corporate Governance Save Distressed Firms from 
Bankruptcy? An Empirical Analysis’, 30 Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 225 (2008). 
12 Fathi Elloumi and Jean-Pierre Gueyié, ‘Financial Distress and Corporate Governance: An Empirical 
Analysis’, 1 Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 15 (2001). 
13  Tsun-Siou Lee and Yin-Hua Yeh, ‘Corporate Governance and Financial Distress: Evidence from 
Taiwan’ 12 Corporate Governance: An International Review 378 (2004).  
14 Shamsul Nahar Abdullah, ‘Board Structure and Ownership in Malaysia: The Case of Distressed Listed 
Companies‘, 6 Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 582 (2006). 
15 Seema Miglani, Kamran Ahmed and Darren Henry, ‘Voluntary Corporate Governance Structure and 
Financial Distress: Evidence from Australia’, 11 Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics 18 
(2015).  
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probability of bailouts of banks in the financial crisis, including governance 
mechanisms, either in a cross-country or in a single country context, is to the best of our 
knowledge almost non-existent.16 Bailed-out banks are, by definition, in some sort of 
distress and exhibit high risk.17 
Being the “ultimate centre of control” of a firm,18 the board is responsible for its 
health and survival and thus, for the potential need of a bailout. Corporate boards of 
directors are responsible for different tasks and responsibilities. “Among these, and 
possibly the most critical is the obligation to maintain the firm's solvency”.19 Previous 
studies have acknowledged that the board’s functions of monitoring, advising and 
providing resources are essential to any firm’s survival but they do not devote attention 
to how board configuration influences the probability of bailouts of banks in the 
financial crisis. So, our first research question is whether bank board characteristics 
prior to the financial crisis affect the likelihood of bank bailouts following the crisis. 
The financial crisis has also raised questions related to risk measurement, risk 
growth and risk management within financial organisations in general and banks in 
particular. So, our second research question is whether the specific risks levels of banks 
- such as credit risk, liquidity risk and growth risk - before the crisis influence the 
probability of receiving bailouts following the crisis. If this relationship exists then a 
proper and regular assessment/analysis of risk can mitigate or even avoid bank bailouts.  
Finally, our third research question is whether the pre-crisis size of banks, in order 
to analyse the well-known “too-big-to-fail” issue, and the pre-crisis bank capital are 
related to the likelihood of banks being bailed out following the crisis. 
We examine the effect of the board of banks, specific risks levels of banks, size 
and capital of banks capital immediately prior to the financial crisis (2006) on the 
likelihood of bailouts following the crisis (2007 to 2009). Additionally, we include a set 
                                                 
16 The exceptions are the studies of Renée Birgit Adams, ‘Governance and the Financial Crisis’, 12 
International Review of Finance 7 (2012) and Robert Carty and Gail Weiss, ‘Does CEO Duality Affect 
Corporate Performance? Evidence from the US Banking Crisis’, 20 Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance 26 (2012), both analysing the US Federal Government bailout programmes. 
17 Lammertjan Dam and Michael Koetter, ‘Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany’, 
25 The Review of Financial Studies 2343 (2012).  
18 Mark S. Mizruchi, ‘Who Controls Whom? An Examination of the Relation between Management and 
Boards of Directors in Large American Corporations’, 8 Academy of Management Review 426 (1983), at 
433. 
19 Harlan Platt and Marjorie Platt, ‘Corporate Board Attributes and Bankruptcy’, 65 Journal of Business 
Research 1139 (2012), at 1139. 
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of control variables: bank-level and country-level control variables. We measure the 
variables before the crisis for two main reasons. First, since the effects of the crisis are 
overwhelming it is crucial to know if, and how, boards, specific risks levels, size and 
capital determine the probability of bank rescue from financial distress, in order to 
avoid bankruptcy, thereby influencing banking stability. For example, it is very useful 
to be aware whether a bank that has more experienced boards when entering the crisis 
will benefit from this greater experience following the crisis. Thus, we attempt to 
identify, at a bank level, early warning indicators of bank bailouts. Second, this 
approach mitigates endogeneity concerns because we use lagged independent variables 
to explain the probability of bailout, which makes it less likely that these variables are 
jointly determined. 
Our study contributes to the ongoing debate regarding appropriate regulatory 
reform in the banking system by shedding light on the extent to which bank-specific 
corporate governance characteristics and in particular the features of the board of banks, 
which is one of the main governance mechanisms, specific risks levels of banks, bank 
size and bank capital have an impact on the likelihood of bailouts and, consequently, on 
the stability/fragility of the banking system. The severity of the financial crisis has 
produced strong pressure in favour of reforming financial regulation. So, by analysing 
the determinants of the likelihood of banks receiving State aid, our study helps public 
authorities in the process of introducting new recommendations, rules and practices, 
namely in their corporate governance codes, in order to prevent or mitigate a collapse in 
the future and, thus, promote stability. In short, our findings provide useful insights into 
the determinants of the banking sector health in Europe and, thereby, they are helpful in 
assisting banking supervisors and regulators in their task of guaranteeing a stable 
system.  
Our paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature in four ways. First, unlike 
previous studies that analyse firms’ probability of financial distress or bankruptcy in 
individual countries or groups of countries outside of Europe, we focus on the 
likelihood of bailout occurrence for banks in 17 European countries. We are not 
interested in financial distress per se nor in bankruptcy, but rather in financial distress 
that due to bailouts do not reach the stage of bankruptcy. So, we focus on a specific and 
different dimension of financial distress. Second, our paper adds to the literature that 
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examines the influence of the features of the board on bank life as it provides a detailed 
analysis of the impact the characteristics of the board on bailouts. Therefore, it may be 
useful in the process of (re)configuring boards and may assist directors in taking steps 
that will decrease the likelihood of State aid. Third, we also include in our study the 
examination of the role of the specific risks of banks in predicting bailouts, using 
accounting and market measures. So, risk indicators are explicitly incorporated in our 
model.  
Many banks had to be bailed out by their governments. It is believed that an 
analysis of the factors that led to the problems suffered by banks in Europe will be of 
enormous benefit. First, the findings can help banking authorities in their duty of 
ensuring a stable financial system. Second, the early detection of potential problems is 
likely to help reduce the expected cost of State aid and to decrease the likelihood of the 
problem spreading more widely through the financial system due to banking 
interconnectedness. Thus, we intend to provide an identification of the factors that make 
banks more prone to being bailed out by their governments, helping to predict bank 
bailouts and permitting the development of the necessary steps to avoid them. 
We note that we investigate the determinants of the likelihood of bailouts of 
European banks following the financial crisis in order to answer the question "What is 
behind the bailouts of European banks?” We do not examine the amount of the bailout 
received by banks (e.g. the impact of the characteristics of the board on the amount of 
government assistance provided to banks) for two reasons. The first is that for some 
banks it is not possible to know exactly the amount of aid received but only the 
maximum amount of aid made available by the government, 20  thereby introducing 
potential errors in our analysis. The second is that for some other banks there is no 
available information on the amount of the bailout, either available or used. Thus, we 
would lose an important number of observations (banks), significantly reducing the 
sample size.  
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 2 present the literature 
review and the hypotheses development, Section 3 describes the data and methodology, 
Section 4 provides the empirical results and Section 5 provides the conclusion. 
                                                 
20 For example, for some banks of our sample we only know that the government “provided up to a 
certain amount of capital” but not the exact amount used. 
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2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
The literature which focuses on bailouts in the context of the crisis is practically 
inexistent, therefore we refer several times to the available literature relating to financial 
distress and bankruptcy as a basis for the formulation of our hypotheses. 
 
2.1 Board independence and bailouts 
Board composition critically influences the success of a firm. 21  Donald C 
Hambrick and Richard A. D'Aveni argue that corporate failure may occur when the 
composition of a board is imbalanced or inadequate.22 So, incorrect representation of 
independent directors may affect a firm’s ability to survive. For Catherine M. Daily and 
Dan R. Dalton although neither the number of independent directors nor the proportion 
of such directors are associated with bankruptcy, the effect of the interaction between 
the percentage of independent directors and the joint Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO)/Chairman roles is strongly related to bankruptcy. 23  Identically, for Kaouthar 
Lajili and Daniel Zéghal the proportion of independent directors is positively but not 
significantly associated with the likelihood of bankruptcy.24 Nevertheless, the three-way 
interaction term between independence, cumulative blockholding and duality structure 
show a positive and significant relationship. Furthermore, Catherine M. Daily and Dan 
R. Dalton show evidence that bankrupt firms have a higher proportion of affiliated 
directors. 25  The structure-composition interaction term (the interaction between 
CEO/Chairman structure and the proportion of affiliated directors) is significant as well. 
Additionally, Harlan Platt and Marjorie Platt comparing non-bankrupt firms with 
bankrupt firms conclude that non-bankrupt firms have a higher percentage of 
independent directors.26 However, more recently, Hwa-Hsien Hsu and Chloe Yu-Hsuan 
Wu examining the effect of board composition on the likelihood of corporate failure in 
                                                 
21 Hwa-Hsien Hsu and Chloe Yu-Hsuan Wu, ‘Board Composition, Grey Directors and Corporate Failure 
in the UK’, 46 The British Accounting Review 215 (2014). 
22 Donald C Hambrick and Richard A. D'Aveni, ‘Top Team Deterioration as Part of the Downward Spiral 
of Large Corporate Bankruptcies’, 38 Management Science 1445 (1992). 
23 Catherine M. Daily and Dan R. Dalton, ‘Corporate Governance and the Bankrupt Firm: An Empirical 
Assessment’, 15 Strategic Management Journal 633 (1994). 
24  Kaouthar Lajili and Daniel Zéghal, ‘Corporate Governance and Bankruptcy Filing Decisions’, 35 
Journal of General Management 3 (2010). 
25 Catherine M. Daily and Dan R. Dalton, ‘Bankruptcy and Corporate Governance: The Impact of Board 
Composition and Structure’, 37 Academy of Management Journal 1603 (1994). 
26 Harlan Platt and Marjorie Platt, ‘Corporate Board Attributes and Bankruptcy’, 65 Journal of Business 
Research 1139 (2012). 
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the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2010, demonstrate that the likelihood of 
corporate failure is positively related to the proportion of independent directors on 
boards.27 
Concerning financial distress, Fathi Elloumi and Jean-Pierre Gueyié find that the 
proportion of outside directors is negatively associated with financial distress status.28 
So, boards of financially distressed firms have significantly fewer outside members. On 
the contrary, Shamsul Nahar Abdullah, Xavier Brédart and Seema Miglani, Kamran 
Ahmed and Darren Henry show that the impact of board independence on the 
occurrence of financial distress is not significant.29 
In the context of the financial crisis, Renée Birgit Adams compares a set of 
selected governance characteristics in 2007 between sample banks that received bailout 
money from the US government in 2008 and beginning of 2009 (up until April 10, 
2009) and sample banks that survived until April, 2009 and did not receive bailout 
money and she concludes that banks receiving bailout money had boards that were 
more independent. 30  According to Renée Birgit Adams this suggests that board 
independence may not necessarily be beneficial for banks. Independent directors may 
not always have the required expertise to oversee complex banking firms.31 Regarding 
the advisory role of boards, the lack of firm-specific knowledge on the part of 
independent directors may compromise their effectiveness and, so, explaining the 
positive relationship between the incidence of bailouts and board independence. The 
above arguments lead us to the first hypothesis (H1): H1: Board independence increases 
the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme following the financial 
crisis. 
 
                                                 
27 Hwa-Hsien Hsu and Chloe Yu-Hsuan Wu, ‘Board Composition, Grey Directors and Corporate Failure 
in the UK’, 46 The British Accounting Review 215 (2014). 
28 Fathi Elloumi and Jean-Pierre Gueyié, ‘Financial Distress and Corporate Governance: An Empirical 
Analysis’, 1 Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 15 (2001). 
29 Shamsul Nahar Abdullah, ‘Board Structure and Ownership in Malaysia: The Case of Distressed Listed 
Companies‘, 6 Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 582 (2006). 
Xavier Brédart, ‘Financial Distress and Corporate Governance around Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy’, 7 
International Business Research 1 (2014). Xavier Brédart, ‘Financial Distress and Corporate Governance: 
The Impact of Board Configuration’ 7 International Business Research 72 (2014). Seema Miglani, 
Kamran Ahmed and Darren Henry, ‘Voluntary Corporate Governance Structure and Financial Distress: 
Evidence from Australia’, 11 Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics 18 (2015). 
30 Renée Birgit Adams, ‘Governance and the Financial Crisis’, 12 International Review of Finance 7 
(2012). 
31 Ibid. 
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2.2 Board size and bailouts 
Board size has a number of implications for the functioning of the board.32  
Larger boards are less likely to become involved in strategic decision-making 
process33 and may not be able to act effectively as a controlling body as they may have 
difficulties in coordinating their efforts, which leaves management relatively free to 
pursue their own goals.34 From this point of view, a small number of board members 
produces a more effective control mechanism.35 Large boards also may have difficulty 
building the interpersonal relationships that further cohesiveness or maintaining high 
board effort norms36 due to the potential "social loafing" that exists in large groups.37 In 
addition, a smaller board may benefit from its ability to make decisions more quickly 
and avoid time-consuming debates.  
However, a smaller board may more easily be influenced by the CEO and, also, a 
larger board tends to offer a wider range of experience, skills and different views and 
permit the inclusion of multiple perspectives on corporate strategy and operations.38 
Some studies support these arguments.39 Rajeswararao S. Chaganti, Vijay Mahajan and 
Subhash Sharma find that non-failed retailing firms tend to have bigger boards than 
failed ones 40  and Harlan Platt and Marjorie Platt indicate that a smaller board is 
                                                 
32 Rajeswararao S. Chaganti, Vijay Mahajan and Subhash Sharma, ‘Corporate Board Size, Composition 
and Corporate Failures in Retailing Industry’, 22 Journal of Management Studies 400 (1985). 
33 William Q Judge, Jr and Carl P. Zeithaml, ‘Institutional and Strategic Choice Perspectives on Board 
Involvement in the Strategic Decision Process’, 35 Academy of Management Journal 766 (1992). 
34 Rajeswararao S. Chaganti, Vijay Mahajan and Subhash Sharma, ‘Corporate Board Size, Composition 
and Corporate Failures in Retailing Industry’, 22 Journal of Management Studies 400 (1985). 
35  Michael C. Jensen, ‘The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control 
Systems’, 48 The Journal of Finance 831 (1993). 
36  Daniel P. Forbes and Frances J. Milliken, ‘Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding 
Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups’, 24 Academy of Management 489 (1999). 
37 Bibb Latané, Kipling Williams and Stephen Harkins, ‘Many Hands Make Light the Work: The Causes 
and Consequences of Social Loafing’, 37 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 822 (1979).  
38  John A. Pearce II and Shaker A. Zahra, ‘Board Composition from a Strategic Contingency 
Perspective’, 29 Journal of Management Studies 411 (1992). W. Gary Simpson and Anne E. Gleason, 
‘Board Structure, Ownership, and Financial Distress in Banking Firms’, 8 International Review of 
Economics and Finance 281 (1999). Harlan Platt and Marjorie Platt, ‘Corporate Board Attributes and 
Bankruptcy’, 65 Journal of Business Research 1139 (2012). 
39 Rajeswararao S. Chaganti, Vijay Mahajan and Subhash Sharma, ‘Corporate Board Size, Composition 
and Corporate Failures in Retailing Industry’, 22 Journal of Management Studies 400 (1985). Harlan Platt 
and Marjorie Platt, ‘Corporate Board Attributes and Bankruptcy’, 65 Journal of Business Research 1139 
(2012). Xavier Brédart, ‘Financial Distress and Corporate Governance: The Impact of Board 
Configuration’ 7 International Business Research 72 (2014). 
40 Rajeswararao S. Chaganti, Vijay Mahajan and Subhash Sharma, ‘Corporate Board Size, Composition 
and Corporate Failures in Retailing Industry’, 22 Journal of Management Studies 400 (1985). 
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positively associated with bankrupt firms.41  Also, Xavier Brédart shows a negative 
association between board size and financial distress.42 Additionally, for Xavier Brédart 
the hypothesis which suggests that the board size has a negative impact on financial 
distress probability is partially supported by his model.43 
In contrast, other studies contradict this evidence. For W. Gary Simpson and Anne 
E. Gleason the number of directors on the board does not appear to impact future 
financial distress44 and Fathi Elloumi and Jean-Pierre Gueyié report that there is no 
significant difference between the board size of the financially distressed and healthy 
firms.45 Additionally, Kaouthar Lajili and Daniel Zéghal and Ali F. Darrat, Stephen 
Gray, Jung Chul Park and Yanhui Wu report that board size is not significantly 
associated with the likelihood of bankruptcy.46 
Some other studies support the advantages of smaller boards.47 Eliezer M. Fich 
and Steve L. Slezak contend that distressed firms with smaller boards are more likely to 
avoid bankruptcy, meaning that board size is significantly positively related to the 
probability of bankruptcy.48 Also, according to Charbel Salloum and Nehme Azoury 
board size and financial distress are positively correlated.49 In the financial crisis, Renée 
Birgit Adams compares banks that received TARP money in 2008 and 2009 to those 
                                                 
41 Harlan Platt and Marjorie Platt, ‘Corporate Board Attributes and Bankruptcy’, 65 Journal of Business 
Research 1139 (2012). 
42 Xavier Brédart, ‘Financial Distress and Corporate Governance: The Impact of Board Configuration’ 7 
International Business Research 72 (2014). 
43 Xavier Brédart, ‘Financial Distress and Corporate Governance around Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy’, 7 
International Business Research 1 (2014). 
44  W. Gary Simpson and Anne E. Gleason, ‘Board Structure, Ownership, and Financial Distress in 
Banking Firms’, 8 International Review of Economics and Finance 281 (1999). 
45 Fathi Elloumi and Jean-Pierre Gueyié, ‘Financial Distress and Corporate Governance: An Empirical 
Analysis’, 1 Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 15 (2001). 
46  Kaouthar Lajili and Daniel Zéghal, ‘Corporate Governance and Bankruptcy Filing Decisions’, 35 
Journal of General Management 3 (2010). Ali F. Darrat, Stephen Gray, Jung Chul Park and Yanhui Wu, 
‘Corporate Governance and Bankruptcy Risk’, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1710412> or 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1710412 > (visited 31 July 2014) (2014). 
47  Eliezer M. Fich and Steve L. Slezak, ‘Can Corporate Governance Save Distressed Firms from 
Bankruptcy? An Empirical Analysis’, 30 Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 225 (2008). 
Renée Birgit Adams, ‘Governance and the Financial Crisis’, 12 International Review of Finance 7 (2012). 
Charbel Salloum and Nehme Azoury, ‘Corporate Governance and Firms in Financial Distress: Evidence 
from a Middle Eastern Country’, 7 International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics 1 (2012). 
48  Eliezer M. Fich and Steve L. Slezak, ‘Can Corporate Governance Save Distressed Firms from 
Bankruptcy? An Empirical Analysis’, 30 Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 225 (2008). 
49  Charbel Salloum and Nehme Azoury, ‘Corporate Governance and Firms in Financial Distress: 
Evidence from a Middle Eastern Country’, 7 International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics 1 
(2012). 
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that did not and concludes that banks with TARP funds have larger boards. 50  The 
second hypothesis (H2) is then stated as follows: H2: Board size increases the likelihood 
of a bank participating in a bailout programme following the financial crisis. 
 
2.3 CEO duality and bailouts 
CEO duality has come under renewed scrutiny because of the perceived loss of 
board vigilance and resultant abuse of power. Robert Carty and Gail Weiss investigate 
whether CEO duality is associated with the receipt of bailout funds by publicly traded 
banks in the US and they do not find evidence that banks with a dual CEO corporate 
governance structure are more likely to participate in the Federal Government’s bailout 
programmes. 51  Consistent with this view, other studies do not find a significant 
association between duality and the probability of financial distress.52  
However, Catherine M. Daily and Dan R. Dalton have evidenced that bankrupt 
firms are not more likely to be associated with the joint CEO/board structures but firms 
that are simultaneously characterized by joint CEO/Chairman structures and lower 
proportions of independent directors are associated with bankruptcy. 53  Additionally, 
Kaouthar Lajili and Daniel Zéghal note that the duality structure is not a significant 
governance variable that affects the likelihood of bankruptcy, but when combined with 
board independence and cumulative blockholding the impact is positively significant.54 
It has been repeatedly emphasised that boards are more effective when one person 
does not simultaneously occupy the positions of CEO and Chairman. Jay W Lorsch and 
Elizabeth MacIver specifically suggest that “providing a leader [of the board] separate 
from the CEO could significantly help directors prevent crises, as well as to act swiftly 
                                                 
50 Renée Birgit Adams, ‘Governance and the Financial Crisis’, 12 International Review of Finance 7 
(2012). 
51 Robert Carty and Gail Weiss, ‘Does CEO Duality Affect Corporate Performance? Evidence from the 
US Banking Crisis’, 20 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 26 (2012). 
52 Fathi Elloumi and Jean-Pierre Gueyié, ‘Financial Distress and Corporate Governance: An Empirical 
Analysis’, 1 Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 15 (2001). Shamsul 
Nahar Abdullah, ‘Board Structure and Ownership in Malaysia: The Case of Distressed Listed 
Companies‘, 6 Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 582 (2006). 
Seema Miglani, Kamran Ahmed and Darren Henry, ‘Voluntary Corporate Governance Structure and 
Financial Distress: Evidence from Australia’, 11 Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics 18 
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when one occurs.”55 Evidence by Donald C Hambrick and Richard A. D'Aveni supports 
this idea as they report that dominant CEOs are more likely to be associated with firm 
bankruptcy.56 Also, other studies report that this duality is more prevalent in bankrupt 
firms.57 Based on the previous arguments, although not specific and directly related to 
bailouts, we predict the third hypothesis (H3) as follows: H3: Dual CEO corporate 
governance structure increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout 
programme following the financial crisis. 
 
2.4 Board experience and bailouts 
Operations of some firms are more technically demanding, thereby requiring 
specialist knowledge58 as is the case of banks. Industry expertise equips directors with a 
deeper understanding of the more complex financial instruments and transactions, 
industry dynamics and regulatory environment. Additionally, boards with financial 
experience have a better comprehension of the more opaque assets and complex 
activities, but financially experienced boards must also be given the right incentives to 
dissuade them from taking excessive risks.59 On the one hand, boards with significant 
financial expertise should moderate risk exposure at their financial institutions and 
consequently mitigate or even prevent losses. A more financially knowledgeable board 
can recognise risks that will not pay off or that are unsound for the financial stability of 
the bank and can advise managers on avoiding such risks. On the other hand, financial 
experts on the board might recognise the government guarantee offered to banks and, 
consequently, be encouraged to pursue more risk-taking activities. 
Concerning the financial crisis we expect that financial/banking experience plays 
a key role. An analysis of Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch prior to their collapse 
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shows that their boards of directors lacked sufficient financial expertise.60 Harald Hau 
and Marcel Thum find evidence that the lack of financial experience of board members 
in German banks was strongly positively related to losses by the banks.61 In a sample of 
banks bailed out under the TARP, Nuno Fernandes and Eliezer M. Fich show that the 
probability of a bailout decreases as experience increases.62 Overall, the results indicate 
that banks with banking experts on their boards are less likely to be bailed out. So, the 
banking experience of boards is expected to equally be of great relevance concerning 
the probability of bailouts of banks in Europe, providing them monitoring and advisory 
advantages. The fourth hypothesis (H4) is then stated as follows: H4: Supervisory 
directors’ banking experience decreases the likelihood of a bank participating in a 
bailout programme following the financial crisis. 
 
2.5 Director tenure and bailouts 
The question of dealing with the length of service period or tenure should directly 
impact the way firms are governed.63 Boards with low tenure lack internal knowledge of 
the firm and industry specific issues and thus, are not as effective in decision making as 
boards with longer tenure.64 On the other hand, extended tenure may magnify agency 
problems between insiders and outsiders.65 However, Stanley C. Vance contends that 
forcing directors to retire leads to a waste of talent and experience.66 By being allowed 
to serve more time on the board, supervisory directors could gain more intrinsic and 
precious knowledge about the firm’s business environment, products and markets, as 
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well as its financial position and growth strategies. 67  This firm-specific knowledge 
obtained over time helps reduce information asymmetry between the board and 
management.68  
In the context of the subprime lending, Maureen I. Muller-Kahle and Krista B. 
Lewellyn find that the board configuration of the financial institutions that engaged in 
subprime lending were significantly different from those that did not. Specifically, 
subprime lenders had less board tenure.69  
Considering the special nature of banks, by extending the tenure on the boards, 
supervisory directors are in a better position to effectively monitor, detect and control 
opportunistic managerial behaviour in a timely manner, as well as to provide valuable 
and appropriate advice, thus potentially avoiding bailouts of banks. Supervisory 
directors with relatively short tenure on the board would be unable to detect signs of the 
severity of the problems, as in the pre-crisis period, and respond in a timely manner to 
problems arising from the activities of the bank on whose board they serve, making it 
more likely to be bailed out. Therefore, we formulate the fifth hypothesis (H5) as 
follows: H5: The longer the supervisory directors have served on the board, the less the 
likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme following the financial crisis. 
 
2.6 Board busyness and bailouts 
More recent theoretical and empirical research highlights the importance of busy 
directors for the board process. Nevertheless, there is compelling theory and evidence to 
support competing positions on the governance impact of busy directors. 
The first perspective, referred to as the Reputational Hypothesis, reflects the view 
that busy directors are preferred due to their superior ability as they are familiar with 
different managerial styles and business strategies and also bring a useful network and 
business contacts.  
The second view of the role of busy directors, called Busyness Hypothesis, asserts 
that serving on multiple boards overcommits a director, which results in the director 
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becoming too busy to adequately monitor management or, otherwise, shirking their 
governance responsibilities. The point behind the problem of busy directors is that, the 
busier a director is, the less effort he/she devotes to each of his/her tasks. So, multiple 
board appointments can adversely affect a board’s decision-making effectiveness. 
However, according to the Reputational Hypothesis the directors who are considered 
“busy” or “extremely busy” are chosen to be on so many boards precisely because of 
their high ability, which serves to offset the effect of their insufficient time. Maureen I. 
Muller-Kahle and Krista B. Lewellyn provide evidence that effort levels by board 
members decrease when directors serve on several boards.70 Thus, busy directors will 
not be able to devote sufficient effort to any one board, which provides support for the 
Busyness Hypothesis. Fathi Elloumi and Jean-Pierre Gueyié show that the likelihood of 
financial distress increases as outside directors hold more directorships.71 This result is 
consistent with the view that additional directorships held by outside directors distract 
these directors from their monitoring responsibilities, thereby increasing the likelihood 
of financial distress. In the same way, Greg Berberich and Flora Niu document a 
positive relationship between director busyness and the likelihood of encountering 
governance problems, which suggests that holding too many board appointments has a 
detrimental effect on corporate governance.72 Further, Maureen I. Muller-Kahle and 
Krista B. Lewellyn find a positive relationship between busy outside directors and 
subprime lending.73 Thus, subprime lenders had boards that were busier. Decisions by 
financial institutions to engage heavily in subprime lending may have arisen from the 
board being busy with the tasks of others firms, consequently lacking time and 
motivation to put in the effort required to provide significant and proper strategic 
guidance. “Thus, firms with busy boards are more likely to suffer from ineffective 
group decision making that could lead to financial firms choosing to take part in 
subprime lending”74 and, thereby, to participate in a bailout programme. In accordance 
with previous studies we expect to confirm the Busyness Hypothesis. Accordingly, we 
                                                 
70 Ibid. 
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state the sixth hypothesis (H6) as follows: H6: Busier supervisory directors on the board 
increase the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme. 
 
2.7 Bank specific risks and bailouts 
The financial crisis has led to a further growing awareness and need for 
appropriate risk analysis in its different components. In quantitative risk management, 
the focus lies on how to enhance the measurement and management of specific risks 
such as liquidity risk, credit risk and market risk.75 Bank soundness can be affected by 
different sources of risk, such as credit risk and liquidity risk76 and so we examine 
whether, and how, various bank specific risks affect the likelihood of being bailed out. 
If there is a relationship, then regular monitoring of risk and early detection of related 
potential problems may help to prevent/mitigate government assistance. In order to 
capture bank specific risks, (i.e. credit risk, liquidity risk and growth risk of the equity 
markets), indicators from the balance sheets of banks and from the market are used.  
For E. Philip Davis and Dilruba Karim a symptom of banking crises is increased 
credit risk or the probability that a borrower will default, converting an asset into a 
“bad” or non-performing loan (NPL).77 “Although banks enjoy advantages in screening 
and monitoring borrowers, both of which reduce credit risk, the high levels of NPLs 
associated with crises indicate risk assessment by banks deteriorates during pre-crisis 
periods.”78 Andrea Cipollini and Franco Fiordelisi find that a higher proportion of NPLs 
increases the probability of observed distressed Shareholder Value Ratio.79 Similarly, 
David G. Mayes and Hanno Stremmel show that NPLs positively influence the 
likelihood of bank distress.80 Also, Lammertjan Dam and Michael Koetter show that 
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credit risk is associated with a higher expected bailout probability.81 Thus, the seventh 
hypothesis and the first related to bank specific risks (H7.1) is the stated as follows: H7.1: 
Credit risk increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme. 
 
Banks need liquidity to meet deposit withdrawals and satisfy customer loan 
demand. Liquidity risk at banks can be defined as the likelihood that the demand for 
cash by bank customers exceeds the bank’s ready supply of cash.82 Liquidity risk arises 
from the inability of a bank to accommodate decreases in liabilities or to fund increases 
in assets.83 Banks need to have sufficient liquidity assets to avoid incurring a high 
liquidity risk. This ensures that immediate funds will be available at the lowest cost. 
According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “liquidity is the ability of a 
bank to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due, without 
incurring unacceptable losses.” 84  David G. Mayes and Hanno Stremmel, using as 
measure of liquidity the loan-to-deposit ratio, find that the lack of liquidity influences 
positively the likelihood of bank distress.85 Additionally, to control for liquidity risk 
Lammertjan Dam and Michael Koetter use the sum of cash and overnight interbank 
assets to total assets and conclude that liquidity is not significant in explaining the 
probability of bank bailouts during 1995-2006.86  
In the context of the financial crisis and in accordance with the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision which emphasises the importance of liquidity to the 
functioning of financial markets and the banking sector, as well as the need for adequate 
risk management,87 the seventh hypothesis and the second related to bank specific risks 
(H7.2) is stated as follows: H7.2: Liquidity risk increases the likelihood of a bank 
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participating in a bailout programme. 
Finally, we analyse the growth risk measured by market-to-book ratio. Since book 
value does not include future growth potential but market value does, the ratio of the 
market value to the book value is expected to be higher for a firm that is perceived to 
have many growth opportunities.88 Therefore, the deviation of market value from book 
value depends on the expected growth opportunities and so, it reflects investor 
expectations regarding the future growth of the firm. Market-to-book ratio is considered 
a good proxy for the presence of profitable growth options,89 measuring the market‘s 
perception of the firm.90 Therefore, it may also be used as a proxy for growth risk. 
Higher market-to-book ratios may signal aggressive and riskier strategies to support a 
higher market evaluation of the growth opportunities materialized, for example, in the 
loosening of lending and other banking activity standards. In other words, as more 
growth opportunities are available, banks have stronger incentives to pursue riskier 
strategies in order to exploit those opportunities to compete. In fact, the top 
management of high-growth firms would need to make strategic and riskier decisions to 
stay competitive.91 Since the market-to-book ratio is a standard measure in the literature 
to proxy for growth opportunities,92 banks with more growth opportunities have higher 
market-to-book ratio, which reflect higher risk. Thus, the market to book ratio is used as 
a measure of growth risk. Accordingly, the seventh hypothesis and the third related to 
bank specific risks (H7.3) is stated as follows: H7.3: Growth risk increases the likelihood 
of a bank participating in a bailout programme. 
 
2.8 Bank size and bailouts 
Large banks have received generous sums of government money and other 
support measures in order to keep them afloat, given their looming insolvency. “The 
argument for such policy intervention is that some banks are of a size (and with so 
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important interconnections with other banks) that gives them system-wide relevance.”93 
The failure of a large financial institution will have ramifications for other financial 
institutions and therefore the risk to the economy would be enormous.94 For Stavros 
Panageas governments sponsored bailouts given that some of the financial institutions 
were considered “too-big-to-fail”.95 On the one hand, public bailouts become necessary 
because the collapse of large banks can impose substantial costs on the real economy. 
On the other hand, government support of "too-big-to-fail" financial institutions during 
the crisis provided incontestable proof that these institutions benefit from large explicit 
and implicit public subsidies, including the expectation that they will receive similar 
public support during future emergencies.96 In this way, public bailouts can create moral 
hazard problems. Banks have an incentive to grow to a size that, in case of misfortune, 
ensures that they are saved.97  
Nuno Fernandes and Eliezer M. Fich find that the probability of a bank being 
bailed out increases as its size increases. 98  This result is in accordance with the 
commonly held view that many banks were bailed out because they were deemed “too-
big-to-fail” by regulators. Large banks are likely to play a greater role in a country´s 
economic performance and thus may be more likely to receive bailouts. Thus, the eighth 
hypothesis (H8) is formulated as follows: H8: Bank size increases the likelihood of a 
bank participating in a bailout programme. 
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2.9 Bank capital and bailouts 
Public requirement for more bank capital tends to be greater after financial crises 
and reform proposals usually focus on how capital regulation should adapt to prevent 
future crises.99  
In the Basel framework bank capital is a main variable for ensuring healthy banks. 
Also, many theories suggest that capital improves a bank’s survival probability. On the 
one hand, bank capital serves as a cushion to absorb losses and shocks.100 A higher level 
of capital acts as a buffer against financial losses, protecting a bank’s solvency, and is 
expected to decrease the probability of a bank failure.101 On the other hand, bank capital 
has a direct positive effect on monitoring incentive, as well as reducing the probability 
of default.102 Additionally, a stronger capital base attenuates the excessive risk-taking 
incentives. 
Rebel A. Cole  and Lawrence J. White use proxies for the CAMELS indicators103 
to explain banking failures in the recent financial crisis and they find that capital is one 
of the factors that explains bank failures during 2009. 104  Allen N. Berger, Björn 
Imbierowicz and Christian Rauch analyse the role of corporate governance on US 
commercial bank failures during the financial crisis and also find that larger amounts of 
capital decrease the probability of default.105 Finally, Allen N. Berger and Christa H. S. 
Bouwman show that having more capital increases the probability of survival of small 
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banks at all times and of medium and large banks during banking a crisis.106 According 
with the arguments presented above, the ninth hypothesis (H9) is formulated as follows: 
H9: Bank capital level decreases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout 
programme. 
 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1 Sample and data sources 
The 72 banks in our sample corresponds to those that actually meet the 
cumulative selection criteria of (i) being publicly listed at the end of December 2005 
that is, listed, at least, for the whole of 2006 (so, at least one complete year before the 
beginning of 2007) and not delisted during the crisis period, (ii) with common shares 
traded on a regulated market and that are not a subsidiary of a bank already included in 
the sample so as to prevent duplication of data, and (iii) that are covered by BoardEx, 
our data source on board information. Given the existence of a number of missing 
observations in some of the variables and the fact that the omitted variables are different 
between banks, this led to the usage of a smaller number of observations which can 
further vary according to each model specification. 
In our analysis we are interested in troubled banks receiving different types of 
State assistance (recapitalisation, guarantees or other aid) from their national 
government so as to avoid failure or dissolution. To identify such banks we use various 
sources of information.  
Our first source is the European Commission website, in which we run detailed 
searches on the individual banks. We combine this source with two other sources: the 
annual reports and other documents available on the bank’s official website. 
Additionally, we conduct keyword Google searches using a combination of: (1) the 
name of each bank in our sample, (2) the terms “bailout”, “bailed out”, “rescue”, 
“capital injection”, “recapitalisation”, “guarantee” or “aid” and (3) the words 
“government” or “State.” Based on all these searches, we create a bank bailout dummy 
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variable equal to one if there is at least one reference to “bailout” for the particular bank 
during the interval 2007- 2009.107  We are interested in whether a specific bank is 
bailout out, not in the total number of bailouts. More specifically, the distribution of the 
number of bailouts in each year is as follows: 1 bailout in 2007, 20 bailouts in 2008 and 
25 bailouts in 2009. There were 19 banks that were bailed out once, 12 banks that were 
bailed out twice and 1 bank that was bailed out three times. 
Further, concerning independent and control variables, data has been extracted 
from several other sources: BoardEx, Datastream, Thomson Financial, annual reports, 
World Bank and Heritage Foundation websites.  
 
3.2 Variables description 
 
3.2.1 Bailout variable 
A dichotomous qualitative dependent variable is used in this study, which we call 
Bank bailout. Bank bailout is a binary variable taking the value of one for a bailed-out 
bank and zero otherwise. 
 
3.2.2 Board characteristics variables  
Our variables of interest regarding the board of banks are: Board independence, 
Board size, CEO duality, Board experience, Director tenure and Board busyness. Board 
independence is defined as the percentage of independent directors. Board size is 
defined as the total number of directors on the board. CEO duality is a dummy variable 
with a value of one if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board and zero otherwise. 
Board experience is measured as the average years of experience in the banking sector 
of the supervisory directors and Director tenure is measured as the average length of 
time, stated in years, that the supervisory directors have been on the board of the bank. 
Said differently, it is the average number of years that the supervisory directors have 
served on the board of the bank. Finally, Board busyness is measured as the average 
number of board positions (number of directorships) held by supervisory directors.  
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3.2.3 Risk variables 
We include a set of variables in order to capture various aspects of a bank’s 
vulnerability: Credit risk (or default risk), Liquidity risk and Growth risk. Information 
from the balance sheets of banks as well as the market is used to measure bank specific 
risks.  
Following the literature, we account for credit risk, which is directly linked to 
asset composition (or asset quality as defined in the CAMELS framework). 108 
According to Shahidur Rahman, Lian Hwa Tan, Ooi Lyn Hew and Yih San Tan and 
Lammertjan Dam and Michael Koetter, Credit risk is measured using the non-
performing loan ratio, calculated as non-performing loan to total loans.109 A high ratio 
indicates a high probability of a bank being bailed out.  
Liquidity risk reflects the probability that banks will be unable to satisfy the 
claims of depositors. Similarly to David G. Mayes and Hanno Stremmel, as proxy for 
Liquidity risk we use the loan-to-deposit ratio, this is, total loans divided by total 
deposits.110 A high ratio may indicate the lack of liquidity and possible repayment 
problems for sudden unforeseen obligations. We expect a positive sign for the Liquidity 
risk variable. 
Growth risk is measured by the market-to-book ratio, that is, the ratio of the 
market value to the equity book value. A higher ratio indicates a more favourable 
market perception and, thus, assessment of the growth options. Therefore, the likelihood 
of a bank being bailed out is lower. 
In a robustness check, we use alternative risk measures. 
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Distress in Eastern European Transition Economies’, 33 Journal of Banking & Finance 244 (2009). Allen 
N. Berger, Björn Imbierowicz and Christian Rauch, ‘The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank 
Failures During the Recent Financial Crisis’, European Banking Center Discussion Paper No. 2012-023, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2163546> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2163546> (visited 28 September 
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110  David G. Mayes and Hanno Stremmel, ‘The Effectiveness of Capital Adequacy Measures in 
Predicting Bank Distress’, 2013 Financial Markets & Corporate Governance Conference, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2191861> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2191861> (visited 22 August 
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3.2.4 Other specific variables of banks: size and capital 
Large-scale collapses can impose substantial costs on the real economy, making a 
public bailout inevitable. Thus, large banks may be more likely to receive government 
support when confronted with financial distress. To capture the size of the bank, Bank 
size variable, we use the natural logarithm of market capitalization and alternatively, in 
a robustness check, we use the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Additionally, following several papers, we measure bank capital, Capital variable, 
by the ratio of total equity to total assets. We expect that a higher ratio makes the bank 
more resilient to shocks (such a sudden decline in the value of bank assets), other things 
being equal. Although the risk-weighted capital ratios measures are used in some 
previous studies “they are open to manipulation and provide space for discretion to 
cover up the real condition of the bank.”111 More fragile banks tend to manipulate risk-
weighted measures, thereby helping to make less clear their true position. 112 
Accordingly, similarly to various other studies,113 we use a non-risk-weighted capital 
measure.114 However, alternatively, as a robustness check, we re-run our model using as 
a risk-weighted capital ratio measure the capital adequacy ratio Tier 1, which represents 
the ratio of Tier 1 Capital to total risk-weighted assets, calculated in accordance with 
banking regulations and expressed as a percentage, obtained directly from Datastream.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
111  David G. Mayes and Hanno Stremmel, ‘The Effectiveness of Capital Adequacy Measures in 
Predicting Bank Distress’, 2013 Financial Markets & Corporate Governance Conference, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2191861> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2191861> (visited 22 August 
2014) (2012), at 12. 
112 Mike Mariathasan and Ouarda Merrouche, ‘The Manipulation of Basel Risk-Weights: Evidence from 
2007-10’ University of Oxford, Department od Economics, Discussion Paper No. 621, 
<http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/Department-of-Economics-Discussion-Paper-Series/the-manipulation-
of-basel-risk-weights-evidence-from-2007-10 >(visited 3 October 2014) (2012).. 
113 See e.g., Timothy J. Curry, Peter J. Elmer and Gary. S. Fissel, ‘Using Market Information to Help 
Identify Distressed Institutions: A Regulatory Perspective’, 15 FDIC Banking Review Series 1 (2003) 
and Kadri Männasoo and David G. Mayes, ‘Explaining Bank Distress in Eastern European Transition 
Economies’, 33 Journal of Banking & Finance 244 (2009). 
114 Also, “the risk-weighted measures that lie at the heart of the Basel system are not the best predictor 
available” [of bank weakness] (David G. Mayes and Hanno Stremmel, ‘The Effectiveness of Capital 
Adequacy Measures in Predicting Bank Distress’, 2013 Financial Markets & Corporate Governance 
Conference, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2191861> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2191861> (visited 22 
August 2014) (2012), at 2. 
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3.2.5 Control variables  
 
3.2.5.1 Bank-level indicators 
We consider stock returns from January 2006 to December 2006 (2006 
performance) to account for prior bank performance, institutional ownership 
(Institutional ownership) to control for ownership structure and the existence of a 
corporate governance committee (CG committee), which is represented by a dummy 
variable coded as one if the bank has a corporate governance committee and as zero 
otherwise. Institutional ownership is measured as the percentage of shares owned by 
institutional investors. Additionally, in an alternative version of our baseline model we 
account for the existence of a board audit committee (Audit committee), which is 
represented by a dummy variable coded as one if a separate audit committee is present 
in a particular bank and as zero otherwise. 
 
3.2.5.2 Country-specific banking sector and macroeconomic environment 
indicators 
Evidence shows that country-level banking sector variables are important 
determinants of a firm’s policies, financial distress, bankruptcy and bailouts, although 
as regards bailouts the literature is far less abundant.  
First, we include Concentration as a control variable. Variables such as the 
concentration of the banking sector are proxies that can give indications on the 
economic importance of the sector and the potential influence of the sector’s lobby.115 
Economic theory provides conflicting predictions about the relationship between the 
concentration and the competitiveness of the banking industry and banking system 
fragility.116 Some theoretical arguments support the “concentration-stability” view that 
banking system concentration reduces fragility. 117  Concentration enhances market 
power and increases profits. Higher profits provide a “buffer” against adverse shocks, 
decreasing the probability of bank distress. In contrast, alternative arguments support 
the “concentration-fragility” view that a more concentrated banking structure raises 
                                                 
115 Emiliano Grossman and Cornelia Woll, ‘Saving the Banks: The Political Economy of Bailouts’, 47 
Comparative Political Studies 574 (2014). 
116 Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, ‘Bank Concentration, Competition, and Crises: 
First Results’, 30 Journal of Banking & Finance 1581 (2006). 
117 Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, Comparing Financial Systems, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000). 
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bank fragility and so, bank distress.118 Ramon Caminal and Carmen Matutes show that 
less competition can lead to less credit rationing, larger loans and a higher probability of 
failure if loans are subject to multiplicative uncertainty.119 In the same way, Tigran 
Poghosyan and Martin Čihak show that banks operating in more concentrated banking 
sectors are more likely to experience bank distress relative to banks operating in less 
concentrated markets, using as measure of concentration the Herfindahl Index. 120 
Advocates of the “concentration-fragility” view also argue that policymakers are more 
concerned about bank failures when there are only a few banks. Concentration may 
reduce competition, increase the market power and political influence of financial 
conglomerates and cause instability of the financial system as banks use their influence 
to shape banking regulations and policies. Our Concentration variable is a measure of 
concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the 
five largest banks in each country. 
Second, another relevant country-level banking sector variable relates to the 
degree of international integration. To control for this we include as variable the ratio of 
consolidated foreign claims to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the banks that are 
reporting to Bank for International Settlements (BIS),121 which we call IIBIS. We can, 
then, evaluate whether bailed out banks were from countries where the banking system 
was more exposed to the international environment. Additionally, in order to control for 
international exposure, and as alternative to the variable IIBIS, we also include the 
foreign presence in domestic banking markets as an additional control variable 
(Foreign). Recent decades have seen an unprecedented degree of globalisation, 
especially in financial services. Banking markets have become increasingly 
international on account of financial liberalisation and overall economic and financial 
integration. 122  In many countries, foreign bank presence in terms of numbers has 
                                                 
118 John H Boyd and Gianni De Nicoló, ‘The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited’, 
60 The Journal of Finance 1329 (2005). 
119 Ramon Caminal and Carmen Matutes , ‘Market Power and Banking Failures’, 20 International Journal 
of Industrial Organization 1341 (2002). 
120 Tigran Poghosyan and Martin Čihak, ‘Determinants of Bank Distress in Europe: Evidence from a New 
Data Set’, 40 Journal of Financial Services Research 163 (2011). 
121 Martin Čihák, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Erik Feyen and Ross Levine, ‘Benchmarking Financial Systems 
around the World’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6175, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2152254 > (visited 5 November 2014) (2012). 
122 Stijn Claessens, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Harry Huizinga, ‘How Does Foreign Entry Affect Domestic 
Banking Markets?’, 25 Journal of Banking & Finance 891 (2001). 
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increased dramatically between 1995 and 2009.123 Banks have expanded internationally, 
namely, by establishing foreign subsidiaries and branches. The global financial crisis 
has highlighted that there can be risks associated with cross-border banking and foreign 
bank presence.124 In fact, since the onset of the global financial crisis, several papers 
have pointed out the risks of foreign banking for financial stability.125  Increasingly 
foreign bank presence may work as a channel of international shocks transmission, 
increasing the vulnerability of domestic banking markets to the international 
environment. As a measure of foreign bank presence, we consider the importance of 
foreign banks in terms of numbers and not in terms of assets. On the one hand, data on 
banking assets that are held by foreign banks is not available for all the countries of our 
sample, whereas, on the other hand, the number of foreign entrants matters rather than 
their market share.126 So, our measure of the degree of foreign participation in domestic 
banking markets, Foreign, which is a proxy of the level of international 
exposure/integration to foreign banks, is the ratio of the number of foreign owned banks 
to the number of the total banks in an economy. A foreign bank is defined as having at 
least 50% of its shares owned by foreigners. 
Third, as a macroeconomic environment control variable, similarly to Mara 
Faccio, Ronald W. Masulis and John J. McConnell,127 we include GDP per capita to 
control for differences in the level of economic development across countries. More 
specifically, our variable GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. 
Alternativelly, in a robustness check we use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita 
based on purchasing power parity.  
 
3.2.5.3 Supervisory and regulatory environment indicators 
Additionally, to control for supervisory and regulatory environment we include 
two variables: Official index and Financial freedom. 
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The official supervisory powers index, Official index, measures the degree to 
which the country’s commercial bank supervisory agency has the authority to take 
specific actions. It comprises information on many features of official supervision, 
including elements such as the right of the supervisor to meet with the external auditors, 
demand information from them and take legal action against them for negligence and 
force a bank to change its internal organizational structure. Higher values of the index 
indicate greater power. Data on official supervisory powers was obtained from the third 
survey of bank regulation and supervision carried out by the World Bank, available at 
the World Bank website, and discussed in James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr. and 
Ross.128 
Financial freedom is an indicator of banking efficiency, as well as a measure of 
independence from government control and interference in the financial sector. It is a 
composite index covering if foreign banks are able to operate freely, the degree to 
which the government influences allocation of credit, how difficult it is to open 
domestic banks and other financial services firms, the extent to which the financial 
system is regulated, the presence of State-owned banks and whether banks are free to 
provide insurance and securities services to customers. Thus, this aggregate financial 
freedom indicator, Financial Freedom, uses data from regulatory restrictions, entry 
restrictions and State ownership. Higher values indicate fewer restrictions on banking 
freedom and a greater openness of the banking system. On the one hand, fewer official 
impediments to bank operations and entry can stimulate efficiency and diversification 
that fosters stability. On the other hand, greater freedom and openness promotes greater 
international exposures which, during a crisis, can serve as a contagion channel. One 
source of instability in financial systems is the possibility of contagion, in which a small 
shock that initially affects one region or sector or even a few institutions, spreads from 
bank to bank throughout the rest of the system, and then affects the entire economy,129 
as well as other economies.130 
 
                                                 
128 James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr and Ross Levine, ‘Bank Regulations Are Changing: For Better or 
Worse’, 50 Comparative Economic Studies 537 (2008). 
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130 Barry Eichengreen, Ashoka Mody, Milan Nedeljkovic and Lucio Sarno, ‘How the Subprime Crisis 
Went Global: Evidence from Bank Credit Default Swap Spreads’, 31 Journal of International Money and 
Finance 1299 (2012). 
 30 
3.2.5.4 Corruption indicator 
Finally, in order to control for differences in perceived corruption across 
countries, we include the variable freedom from corruption, called Freedom corruption. 
Higher values denote lower levels of corruption. Corruption deteriorates freedom by 
introducing insecurity and uncertainty into economic relationships and is a failure of 
integrity in the economic system. Freedom from corruption is expected to promote 
equitable treatment and greater regulatory efficiency. 
There is an overlap between some of the control variables, which are used for 
robustness purposes. Thus, we note these overlaps and we do not include them 
simultaneously in the regressions.  
The definitions of all the variables are detailed in Appendix 1. 
 
3.3 Empirical framework 
In the proposed empirical model the dependent variable is binary (bailed out or 
not bailed out). Therefore, we estimate cross-sectional probit model regressions to 
determine the likelihood of bank bailouts.  
More specifically, in our model the dependent variable 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 is a bailout 
indicator variable equal to one for banks that are bailed out at any time over the interval 
July 2007 to December 2009 and equal to zero otherwise. Thus, 
 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009] = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑎 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑖𝑛 [2007,2009]         (1) 
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                                                 
 
 
We assume that 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009]
∗  is an unobserved variable of the 
probability that bank 𝑖 received a bailout in the period between July 2007 and December 
2009 and is a function of the board of the bank, bank specific risks, bank size, bank 
capital and a set of control variables, 𝑋𝑖, so that: 
 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009]
∗ = 𝛽𝑋𝑖,2006
′ + 𝜀𝑖,[2007,2009]                           (2) 
where, 𝑖 is the index of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ  bank, 𝑋𝑖,2006
′  is the vector of explanatory variables of 
bank 𝑖  as of December 31, 2006, 𝛽  is the vector of coefficients of the explanatory 
variables and 𝜀𝑖,[2007,2009] is the error term. 
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Specifying equation (2) then, 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑏𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖,[2007,2009]
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,2006 + 
        + 𝛽2(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,2006+ 𝛽3(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,2006 + 
        + 𝛽4(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,2006 + 
        + 𝛽5(𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖,2006 +  
        + 𝛽6(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝑖,2006 + 𝛽7(𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖,2006 +  
        + 𝛽8(𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖,2006 + 𝛽9( 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 )𝑖,2006 + 
        +  𝛽10(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,2006 + 𝛽11(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖,2006 + 
        + 𝛽12(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,2006 + 𝜀𝑖,[2007,2009]                    (3) 
 
We examine the heteroscedasticity using the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test and 
heteroscedasticity was not confirmed in our model.131 Also, we estimate the model with 
robust variances-covariances.132 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent variables used in our 
analysis.  
                                                 
131 We carry out the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for heteroscedasticity using the artificial regression 
method described in detail by Russell Davidson and James G. MacKinnon (Russell Davidson and James 
G. MacKinnon, Estimation and Inference in Econometrics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
We test the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity against the alternative of heteroscedasticity of the form: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(2𝑍𝐼
′𝛾), where 𝛾 is an unknown parameter. 
132 So, the standard errors are robust to certain misspecification of the underlying distribution of the 
binary dependent variable. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
The table reports the descriptive statistics of each variable by showing mean, median, standard deviation 
(Std. dev.), maximum (Max.) and minimum (Min.). 
Variables # Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Max. Min. 
Board independence (%) 72 41.449 44.097 28.729 95.454 0.000 
Board size (Nº) 72 16.389 15.000 5.700 31.000 6.000 
CEO duality 72 0.069 0.000 0.256 1.000 0.000 
Board experience (years) 72 12.751 10.778 6.509 35.064 3.000 
Director tenure (years) 72 5.286 4.900 1.741 11.700 1.100 
Board busyness (Nº) 72 2.631 2.375 1.011 5.750 1.100 
Credit risk (%) 57 2.127 1.080 3.993 28.920 0.080 
Liquidity risk (%) 68 177.439 157.400 148.217 1186.760 46.320 
Growth risk (%) 72 238.588 209.703 108.612 692.477 47.080 
Bank size (€ bil.) 72 22.727 11.410 29.588 160.442 0.220 
Capital (%) 72 5.480 5.244 2.705 14.672 1.792 
2006 performance (%) 72 25.072 20.836 19.611 93.981 -29.251 
Institutional ownership (%) 69 44.464 44.320 27.001 100.000 0.030 
CG committee 68 0.176 0.000 0.384 1.000 0.000 
Audit committee 69 0.812 1.000 0.394 1.000 0.000 
Concentration (%) 72 80.348 82.283 15.275 100.000 49.460 
IIBIS (%) 72 102.401 73.553 57.191 307.321 58.280 
Foreign (%) 72 22.847 13.000 22.324 90.000 1.000 
GDP per capita (US$) 72 38,304.91 36,472.07 10,794.59 72,959.73 19,820.43 
Official index 72 9.306 8.000 2.499 14.000 5.000 
Financial freedom 72 65.000 70.000 15.291 90.000 50.000 
Freedom corruption 72 73.139 75.000 16.733 97.000 43.000 
Note: Observations vary because of missing data.  
Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of each variable. 
 
As can be noted from Table 1, on average, 41.449% of the directors on the board 
are independent. The board has, on average, 16.389 directors, confirming the existing 
literature that banks have on average larger boards than non-financial firms, and a very 
small proportion of banks (6.9%) have a dual CEO corporate governance structure. 
Concerning board experience, director tenure and board busyness we find that, on 
average, supervisory directors have 12.751 years of experience in the banking sector, 
have served on the board 5.286 years and held 2.631 board positions. One aspect 
relating to bank specific risks that stands out is, with the exception of the credit risk, the 
high dispersion. Bank size is, on average € 22.727 billion133 and the capital ratio is, on 
average, 5.48%, which is a low value comparatively to the limits of the different 
components of capital imposed in the Basel III framework.134 
                                                 
133 Due to the quite positively skewed distribution of the Bank size we use the natural logarithm, ln(Bank 
Size), in the regression analysis. 
134 In the Basel III framework, 1) Common Equity Tier 1 must be at least 4.5% of risk-weighted assets at 
all times, 2) Tier 1 Capital must be at least 6.0% of risk-weighted assets at all times, 3) Total Capital 
 33 
Regarding bank-level control variables, the stock returns before the financial 
crisis (2006) are, on average 25.072%, a positive value, although the minimum value is 
negative (-29.251%) and institutional investors own, on average, 44.464% bank shares. 
Also, 17.6% of banks have a corporate governance committee, while about 81.2% have 
an audit committee. So, in our sample of banks the existence of an audit committee is 
more common than a corporate governance committee.  
With respect to country-specific control variables, we note that the percentage of 
assets held by the five largest banks is, on average, 80.348%, a higher percentage 
relatively to other studies (e.g., Gianni De Nicoló, Philip Bartholomew, Jahanara Zaman 
and Mary Zephirin report a mean five-firm concentration ratio of 57% in 1995, which 
increased slightly to 60% in 2000135). The ratio of consolidated foreign claims to GDP 
of the banks that are reporting to BIS is, on average, 102.401% and the percentage of 
foreign banks among total banks is, on average, 22.847%. The GDP per capita ranges 
from a high of US$72,959,73 to a low of US$19,820.43 and the mean is 
US$38,304.91.136 
Furthermore, in our sample, the official supervisory index ranges from a 
minimum of 5 to a maximum of 14, which is also the highest value of the index, and the 
mean is 9.306. Financial freedom ranges from a minimum of 50 to a maximum of 90, 
where the highest value of the index is 100, and a mean is 65. Finally, freedom from 
corruption ranges from a minimum of 43 to a maximum of 97, where the highest value 
of the index is 100, and the mean is 73.139. 
To obtain a first impression on potential differences between bailed out and not 
bailed out banks we compare our main variables, underlying to our hypotheses, between 
these two groups of banks. Descriptive statistics and the univariate tests of differences 
between bailed out and not bailed out banks are reported in Table 2. The univariate tests 
are the t-test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test for the continuous 
variables and the Chi-squared test for the categorical variable. 
                                                                                                                                               
(Tier 1 Capital plus Tier 2 Capital) must be at least 8.0% of risk-weighted assets at all times and 4) a 
minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% during the parallel run period from 1 January 2013 to 1 January 
2017.  
135 Gianni De Nicoló, Philip Bartholomew, Jahanara Zaman and Mary Zephirin, ‘Bank Consolidation, 
Internationalization, and Conglomeration: Trends and Implications for Financial Risk’, 13 Financial 
Markets, Institutions and Instruments 173 (2004). 
136 Although we use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in the regression analysis, ln(GDP per 
capita), in Table 1 the GDP per capita is reported. 
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Table 2 – Comparison between bailed out and not bailed out banks  
The table reports a comparison of the main variables used in the paper’s multivariate analysis between bailed out and not bailed out banks. Descriptive statistics and 
the univariate tests of differences between the two groups of banks are presented. 
Variables # Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Max. Min. t-test a) Wilcoxon 
test/Chi-
squared test a) 
Board independence         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/40 41.971/41.032 46.875/43.651 31.316/26.882 94.736/95.455 0.000/0.000 -0.137 0.380 
Board size         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/40 17.875/15.200 16.000/15.000 5.890/5.321 31.000/29.000 10.000/6.000 -2.021** 1.745* 
CEO duality         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/40 0.098/0.050 0.000/0.000 0.296/0.221 1.000/1.000 0.000/0.000 --- 0.527 
Board experience         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/40 12.722/12.773 10.060/11.298 7.783/5.384 35.064/26.613 3.751/3.000 0.033 0.799 
Director tenure         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/40 5.053/5.473 4.900/4.900 1.741/2.278 8.100/11.700 1.700/1.100 0.859 0.544 
Board busyness         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/40 2.840/2.463 2.575/2.325 1.153/0.860 5.750/5.250 1.100/1.450 -1.588 1.303 
Credit risk         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 26/31 3.237/1.197 1.350/0.890 5.696/0.870 28.920/3.420 0.280/0.080 -1.970* 1.210 
Liquidity risk         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/36 186.242/169.614 154.680/157.400 189.402/100.730 656.560/1186.760 64.220/46.320 -0.459 0.197 
Growth risk          
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/40 230.937/244.708 203.066/223.497 89.938/122.315 422.249/692.477 132.475/47.080 0.532 0.504 
Bank size         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out  32/40 16.518/15.760 16.621/15.837 1.072/1.674 18.390/18.893 14.225/12.305 -2.221** 2.000** 
Capital         
 Bailed out/Not Bailed out 32/40 4.653/6.143 4.416/5.528 1.877/3.083 10.317/14.672 2.08/1.79 2.399** 2.306** 
Note: Observations vary because of missing data.  
Asterisks indicate significance at the1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of each variable. 
a) t-test and the nonparametric Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test for the continuous variables and the Chi-squared test for the categorical variable (CEO duality).  
 
 35 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics categorised for banks that received 
bailouts between 2007 and 2009 and for banks that did not. Also, Table 2 reports the 
results of the t-test, nonparametric Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test and Chi-squared test 
of the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the two subsamples of banks. 
Comparing the results for bailed out and not bailed out banks, and according to 
the mean difference test (t-test), we find that bailed out banks have a larger board, 
higher credit risk, larger size and less capital. The results remain unchanged, with the 
exception of credit risk, according to the median difference tests (Wilcoxon/Mann-
Whitney test and Chi-squared test). Since in a univariate setting we do not control for 
various factors that may influence the likelihood of a bank being bailed out, we will 
forego a detailed analysis of the univariate statistics and instead rely on the multivariate 
regression results to interpret the influence of the variables on bank bailouts in greater 
detail. 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the independent variables. Due 
to the problem of space, given the number of variables, we present the correlation 
matrix in three different panels. Panel A presents the correlation between the main 
variables themselves, Panel B presents the correlation between the main variables and 
the control variables and Panel C presents the correlation between the control variables 
themselves.  
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Table 3 – Pearson correlation matrix: Panel A 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Board 
independence 
1.000           
2 Board size -0.141 1.000          
3 CEO duality 0.021 -0.084 1.000         
4 Board experience -0.153 0.223 -0.057 1.000        
5 Director tenure 0.091 0.046 0.099 0.193 1.000       
6 Board busyness -0.142 0.376*** -0.034 0.434*** 0.135 1.000      
7 Credit risk -0.011 0.068 0.290** -0.015 -0.154 -0.221 1.000     
8 Liquidity risk -0.017 -0.020 -0.165 0.018 0.280 0.141 -0.263 1.000    
9 Growth risk  0.066 -0.288** 0.077 -0.037 0.130 -0.217 -0.057 -0.100 1.000   
10 Bank size 0.442*** 0.240* 0.097 0.065 -0.056 0.136 -0.037 0.453*** 0.219 1.000  
11 Capital -0176 -0.193 0.153 0.050 0.029 -0.065 0.070 -0.183 -0.025 -0.376*** 1.000 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*), using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of each variable. 
 
 
Table 3 – Pearson correlation matrix: Panel B 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
12 2006 performance -0.192 0.038 -0.161 0.415*** 0.030 0.185 0.074 -0.107 0.351*** -0.084 -0.083 
13 Institutional 
ownership 
-0.009 0.094 -0.325** 0.269* 0.125 0.237* -0.104 0.043 -0.064 -0.163 -0.139 
14 CG committee 0.248 -0.050 0.061 0.086 0.276 0.009 -0.020 -0.031 0.168 0.125 -0.088 
15 Audit committee -0.032 -0.053 -0.030 0.024 0.011 -0.109 -0.300** -0.205 0.307** 0.191 -0.306** 
16 Concentration -0.191 -0.083 -0.106 0.099 0.075 0.083 -0.373*** -0.176 0.104 -0.045 -0.256* 
17 IIBIS 0.157 -0.179 -0.154 -0.091 0.015 -0.078 -0.173 -0.188 -0.011 0.081 0.059 
18 Foreign 0.124 -0.016 -0.085 -0.123 0.002 -0.104 0.007 -0.203 0.040 0.166 0.011 
19 GDP per capita 0.051 -0.323** -0.193 -0.303** -0.295** -0.076 -0.279** -0.168 -0.240* 0.046 -0.061 
20 Official index -0.147 -0.073 -0.035 0.277** 0.099 -0.048 -0.114 -0.161 0.269* -0.135 0.108 
21 Financial freedom 0.295** -0.387*** -0.181 -0.174 0.084 -0.221 -0.427*** -0.041 0.124 0.202 -0.131 
22 Freedom corruption -0.004 -0.209 -0.239* -0.029 -0.085 0.026 -0.534*** 0.049 -0.038 0.133 -0.328** 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*), using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of each variable. 
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Table 3 – Pearson correlation matrix: Panel C 
 Variables 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
12 2006 performance 1.000           
13 Institutional 
ownership 
0.184 1.000          
14 CG committee -0.012 -0.136 1.000         
15 Audit committee -0.042 0.035 0.108 1.000        
16 Concentration 0.011 0.066 0.151 0.742*** 1.000       
17 IIBIS -0.203 0.023 0.281** 0.354*** 0.261* 1.000      
18 Foreign -0.277** 0.099 0.281** 0.337** 0.124 0.878*** 1.000     
19 GDP per capita -0.183 -0.034 -0.214 0.149 0.241* 0.402*** 0.092 1.000    
20 Official index 0.108 -0.126 0.346** 0.416*** 0.455*** 0.453*** 0.304** -0.105 1.000   
21 Financial freedom -0.147 0.100 0.037 0.498*** 0.287** 0.623*** 0.518*** 0.483*** 0.125 1.000  
22 Freedom corruption -0.007 0.162 -0.052 0.613*** 0.660*** 0.368*** 0.141 0.702*** 0.144 0.684*** 1.000 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*), using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of each variable. 
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Multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem in our model. The correlation 
coefficients among all independent variables included in each regression analysis are 
less, in absolute value, than 0.8,137 that is the threshold beyond which multicollinearity 
problems arise (e.g., Damodar N. Gujarati 138). In addition, to double check for any 
multicollinearity issue we also compute the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each 
independent variable. All the VIF values (unreported but available upon request) are 
below the critical value of 10,139 which indicate that multicollinearity is not a major 
problem in the regression analyses. We note that, since multicollinearity is mainly an 
issue involving independent variables in a regression rather than the dependent variable 
or the link function between the independent and the dependent variables, the use of 
available linear regression methods is usually applicable in nonlinear regression 
settings. As Scott Menard points up “because the concern is with the relationship among 
the independent variables, the functional form of the model for the dependent variable is 
irrelevant to the estimation of collinearity.”140 
 
4.2 Estimation results on the determinants of bailouts 
In this sub-section we present and analyse the results of the probit regressions 
which test the relationship between the dependent variable Bank bailouts and a set of 
corporate governance variables, bank specific risks, bank capital, bank size and control 
variables. Our goal is to analyse the determinants of the likelihood of bailouts in the 
European banking sector in the context of the global financial crisis. 
Table 4, in Column (1), reports the results of the probit regressions for the 
baseline model. In Columns (2) to (4) we test the robustness of our findings.  
Table 5 reports the results of the baseline model augmented by additional control 
variables. 
                                                 
137 The Pearson correlation between the variables IIBIS and Foreign is higher than 0.8 (specifically 
0.878). However, and first of all for theoretical reasons explained in the text, these variables are not 
included simultaneously in the regression. 
138 Damodar N. Gujarati , Basic Econometrics, 4th ed. (New York: MacGraw-Hill, 2004). 
139 See e.g., Damodar N. Gujarati , Basic Econometrics, 4th ed. (New York: MacGraw-Hill, 2004) and 
Dimitrios Asteriou and Sthephen G. Hall, Applied Econometrics, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011). 
140 Scott Menard, Applied Logistic Regression Analysis, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 
Inc., 2002) 76. 
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Table 4 – Determinants of bailouts 
The table presents the results of the probit regressions used to predict the probability of bailouts in the 
European banking sector in the context of the financial crisis. 
 (1)  
Baseline Model 
(2) (3) (4) 
Board independence 0.021* 
(0.055) 
0.022** 
(0.044) 
0.026** 
(0.019) 
0.009 
(0.409) 
Board size 0.034 
(0.552) 
0.035 
(0.542) 
0.038 
(0.476) 
0.047 
(0.381) 
CEO duality -0.139 
(0.883) 
2.845** 
(0.013) 
-0.092 
(0.919) 
1.735* 
(0.090) 
Board independence × CEO duality --- 
 
-0.049** 
(0.032) 
--- --- 
Board experience -0.190*** 
(0.002) 
-0.185*** 
(0.002) 
-0.144** 
(0.016) 
-0.201*** 
(0.001) 
Director tenure -0.594*** 
(0.010) 
-0.617*** 
(0.007) 
-0.544** 
(0.020) 
-0.772*** 
(0.001) 
Board busyness 1.328*** 
(0.005) 
1.285*** 
(0.004) 
1.296** 
(0.011) 
1.134*** 
(0.006) 
Credit risk 1.083*** 
(0.000) 
1.080*** 
(0.000) 
1.050*** 
(0.000) 
1.356*** 
(0.005) 
Liquidity risk 0.010** 
(0.013) 
0.010*** 
(0.009) 
0.011*** 
(0.007) 
-0.077** 
(0.019) 
Growth risk -0.001 
(0.969) 
0.002 
(0.957) 
0.001 
(0.970) 
-0.009 
(0.383) 
Bank size 0.210 
(0.497) 
0.203 
(0.504) 
0.018 
(0.952) 
0.102 
(0.704) 
Capital -0.233  
(0.149) 
-0.222  
(0.168) 
-0.249  
(0.134) 
-0.071 
(0.566) 
2006 performance 0.043** 
(0.050) 
0.042* 
(0.055) 
0.053** 
(0.035) 
0.049** 
(0.025) 
Institutional ownership -0.006 
(0.529) 
-0.006 
(0.510) 
-0.017  
(0.172) 
0.007 
(0.486) 
CG committee -2.266*** 
(0.007) 
-2.215*** 
(0.006) 
-1.955** 
(0.023) 
-2.220** 
(0.011) 
Concentration 0.083*** 
(0.002) 
0.086*** 
(0.001) 
0.044*** 
(0.004)  
0.064*** 
(0.002) 
IIBIS 0.029*** 
(0.000) 
0.029*** 
(0.000) 
---  0.037*** 
(0.000) 
Foreign --- 
 
--- 0.062*** 
(0.002) 
--- 
GDP per capita -3.513** 
(0.016) 
-3.599** 
(0.013) 
-1.688 
(0.155)  
-7.793*** 
(0.001) 
N 53 53 53 50 
Bailed out/ Not bailed out 23/30 23/30 23/30 22/28 
% correct  83.02 83.02 81.13 84.00 
LR statistics 35.801 
(0.005) 
36.418 
(0.006) 
34.236 
(0.008) 
34.696 
(0.007) 
Pseudo R2  0.493 0.502 0.472 0.506 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at the 
1%  (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. 
Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of each variable. 
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4.2.1 The baseline model 
The baseline estimation results, Column (1) in Table 4, show that the coefficient 
on the Board independence variable is positive and statistically significant and thus, 
board independence positively influence the likelihood of a bailout. This confirms 
hypothesis H1 and is consistent with previous studies in the context of the financial 
crisis 141  and related to corporate failure. 142  Our result suggests that independent 
directors suffer from bank-specific knowledge, which penalises the effectiveness of the 
board and thus, increases the likelihood of a bank participating in a bailout programme. 
The coefficient on the Board size variable, on the contrary, is not statistically 
significant, indicating no association between the board size and the probability of 
bailouts of our sample banks. This finding is consistent with Fathi Elloumi and Jean-
Pierre Gueyié, Kaouthar Lajili and Daniel Zéghal and Ali F. Darrat, Stephen Gray, Jung 
Chul Park and Yanhui Wu respectively on financial distress and bankrupt firms,143 but 
contradicts Renée Birgit Adams144 who finds that banks that received funds from TARP 
in the US have larger board. In a sample of European banks we do not find evidence 
that larger boards of banks are detrimental and, thereby, increase the probability of 
participating in a bailout programme. Our hypothesis H2 is not confirmed. The lack of 
statistical significance regarding the CEO duality variable indicates that separating the 
positions of CEO and Chairman has no impact on the likelihood of a bank being bailed 
out. Therefore, we do not find support for the hypothesis H3. This finding is consistent 
with previous financial distress studies,145 bankruptcy studies146 and the study by Robert 
                                                 
141 Renée Birgit Adams, ‘Governance and the Financial Crisis’, 12 International Review of Finance 7 
(2012). 
142 Hwa-Hsien Hsu and Chloe Yu-Hsuan Wu, ‘Board Composition, Grey Directors and Corporate Failure 
in the UK’, 46 The British Accounting Review 215 (2014). 
143 Fathi Elloumi and Jean-Pierre Gueyié, ‘Financial Distress and Corporate Governance: An Empirical 
Analysis’, 1 Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 15 (2001). Kaouthar 
Lajili and Daniel Zéghal, ‘Corporate Governance and Bankruptcy Filing Decisions’, 35 Journal of 
General Management 3 (2010). Ali F. Darrat, Stephen Gray, Jung Chul Park and Yanhui Wu, ‘Corporate 
Governance and Bankruptcy Risk’, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1710412> or 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1710412> (visited 31 July 2014) (2014) 
144 Renée Birgit Adams, ‘Governance and the Financial Crisis’, 12 International Review of Finance 7 
(2012). 
145 Fathi Elloumi and Jean-Pierre Gueyié, ‘Financial Distress and Corporate Governance: An Empirical 
Analysis’, 1 Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 15 (2001). Shamsul 
Nahar Abdullah, ‘Board Structure and Ownership in Malaysia: The Case of Distressed Listed 
Companies‘, 6 Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 582 (2006). 
Seema Miglani, Kamran Ahmed and Darren Henry, ‘Voluntary Corporate Governance Structure and 
Financial Distress: Evidence from Australia’, 11 Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics 18 
(2015). 
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Carty and Gail Weiss147 which, using a sample of US publicly traded banks, shows that 
banks with a dual CEO structure are not more likely to participate in bailout 
programmes. Thus, results in the European context are in accordance with results in the 
US context. On the contrary, Column (1) in Table 4 reveals that banking experience 
matters and so, we find support for hypothesis H4. The coefficient on the Board 
experience variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating that banking 
experience providing a deep and sound knowledge of the complexity, dynamics and 
specificities of the banking activity, as well as a better comprehension of its opaqueness 
and regulatory environment, make it less likely for a bank to be bailed out as found by 
Nuno Fernandes and Eliezer M. Fich. 148  Thus, banking experience of the board’s 
supervisory directors enables banks to be safer from government assistance. Similarly, 
the coefficient on the Director tenure variable is negative and statistically significant, 
confirming hypothesis H5. As expected, banks with shorter supervisory directors’ tenure 
are more likely to need State aid. Thus, a bank is better served by longer-standing 
supervisory directors’, who have more bank specific knowledge and are better able to 
monitor and advise bank managers. This finding is also found, for example, by 
Kaouthar Lajili and Daniel Zéghal. 149  The positive and statistically significant 
coefficient on the Board busyness variable indicates that busier supervisory directors 
increase the probability of a bank participating in a bailout programme, confirming 
hypothesis H6. This result provides support for the Busyness Hypothesis and the view 
that the presence of supervisory directors holding too many directorships compromises 
board effectiveness. 
With respect to bank specific risks, the coefficients on the Credit risk and 
Liquidity risk variables are positive and statistically significant, while the coefficient on 
the Growth risk variable is not statistically significant. Thus, the credit and liquidity 
risks increase the likelihood of a bank being bailed out while the growth risk has no 
impact. These results confirm hypotheses H7.1 and H7.2 but not hypothesis H7.3. 
                                                                                                                                               
146 Kaouthar Lajili and Daniel Zéghal, ‘Corporate Governance and Bankruptcy Filing Decisions’, 35 
Journal of General Management 3 (2010). 
147 Robert Carty and Gail Weiss, ‘Does CEO Duality Affect Corporate Performance? Evidence from the 
US Banking Crisis’, 20 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 26 (2012). 
148 Nuno Fernandes and Eliezer M. Fich, ‘Does Financial Experience Help Banks During Credit Crises?’, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1409557> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1409557> (visited 1 August 2014) 
> (2013). 
149 Kaouthar Lajili and Daniel Zéghal, ‘Corporate Governance and Bankruptcy Filing Decisions’, 35 
Journal of General Management 3 (2010). 
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Consistent with the general view, (e.g., Lammertjan Dam and Michael Koetter150), the 
decline in the quality of banks’ loan portfolios, resulting in an increasing proportion of 
non-performing loans, is associated with a higher probability of being bailed out. The 
larger the proportion of non-performing loans, the more likely a bank will participate in 
a bailout plan. Also, as expected, we find a positive sign for the liquidity risk measure 
in predicting bailouts. So, as the loan-to-deposit ratio increases the likelihood of a bank 
being bailed out increases. This finding is in accordance with the existence of benefits 
associated with liquidity.  
Furthermore, in our sample of cross-country European banks the coefficient on 
the Bank size variable is not statistically significant, which does not confirm 
hypothesis H8. So, our findings do not support the view that individual bank size creates 
a moral hazard problem resulting from the fact that, as banks grow they increase their 
importance and so the probability of being saved. The issue of “too-big-to-fail” is not 
validated at bank-level but is validated at country-level given that the coefficient on the 
Concentration variable is positive and statistically significant. Concentration variable is 
used as proxy for the importance of the banking sector and its potential influence on 
banking regulations and policies. Size of individual banks does not seem to matter, but 
size (and importance) of the banking sector in a country increases the probability of 
receiving bailouts from government. In contrast to our expectation, the coefficient on 
the Capital variable is not statistically significant. Thus, the capital of banks, in our 
sample, has no impact on the likelihood of bailouts and hypothesis H9 is not confirmed.  
Concerning bank-level control variables, the coefficient on the 2006 performance 
variable is positive and statistically significant and the coefficient on the CG committee 
variable is negative and statistically significant. Our results show that performance 
before the crisis increases the likelihood of bailouts. So, the better-performing banks 
before the crisis are the most likely to be bailed out following the crisis. Also, banks 
with a corporate governance committee are less likely to participate in a bailout 
programme. On the contrary, the coefficient on the Institutional ownership variable is 
not is not statistically significant and thus, institutional investors do not influence the 
likelihood of bailouts. Moreover, we find that country-level variables explain the 
                                                 
150 Lammertjan Dam and Michael Koetter, ‘Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany’, 
25 The Review of Financial Studies 2343 (2012). 
 43 
probability of individual banks being bailed out. The coefficients on Concentration and 
IIBIS variables are both positive and statistically significant. In line with the 
“concentration-fragility” view, 151  we find that banks located in more concentrated 
banking sectors are more likely to be bailed out. Furthermore, we provide empirical 
evidence suggesting the importance of the degree of international integration. Increasing 
the international exposure of a country’s banking system increases the probability of a 
bank of that country participating in a bailout programme. Finally, the coefficient on the 
GDP per capita is negative and significant, indicating that banks are more likely to be 
bailed out in poorer countries.  
 
4.2.2 Robustness checks 
To assess the reliability of the baseline results, we employ a set of robustness 
checks, Table 4, Columns (2)-(4).  
While we do not formally hypothesize interactive effects, we now extend our 
research by explicitly modelling a corporate governance interaction term. The 
underlying idea is that, in addition to the effect of various governance variables (taken 
individually) on the likelihood of bailouts, the interaction effect among these variables 
can help to predict bailouts. Encouraged by previous studies in the context of corporate 
bankruptcy152 we test the interaction between board independence and CEO duality. 
This interaction variable is the unweighted multiplication of a bank's proportion of 
independent directors and dual CEO corporate governance structure. Column (2) 
presents the results when the interaction term among the corporate governance variables 
is included. Interestingly, although board independence and CEO duality (taken 
individually) have a positive impact on the likelihood of bailouts, the two-way 
interaction between board independence and CEO duality has a negative impact. Our 
findings do not confirm those of Catherine M. Daily and Dan R. Dalton,153 who find a 
                                                 
151   See e.g., Gianni De Nicoló, Philip Bartholomew, Jahanara Zaman and Mary Zephirin, ‘Bank 
Consolidation, Internationalization, and Conglomeration: Trends and Implications for Financial Risk’, 13 
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 173 (2004) and Tigran Poghosyan and Martin Čihak, 
‘Determinants of Bank Distress in Europe: Evidence from a New Data Set’, 40 Journal of Financial 
Services Research 163 (2011). 
152 Catherine M. Daily and Dan R. Dalton, ‘Bankruptcy and Corporate Governance: The Impact of Board 
Composition and Structure’, 37 Academy of Management Journal 1603 (1994). Catherine M. Daily and 
Dan R. Dalton, ‘Corporate Governance and the Bankrupt Firm: An Empirical Assessment’, 15 Strategic 
Management Journal 633 (1994). 
153 Ibid. 
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positive relationship in the context of bankrupt firms. The introduction of the interaction 
term leaves the results unchanged, with the exception of CEO duality that gains 
statistical significance. 
In column (3) we replace the IIBIS variable in the baseline model with the 
Foreign variable, which is the fraction of the number of foreign owned banks to the 
number of the total banks in the country. As result of increasing financial integration, 
foreign banks have become important in domestic financial intermediation.154 As there 
is a potential overlap between both variables we do not include them simultaneously in 
the regressions below. Similarly to the coefficient on the IIBIS variable, the coefficient 
on the Foreign variable is significantly positive. Additionally, our qualitative findings 
with respect to the main explanatory variables remain unchanged and with regard to the 
control variables the differences are negligible, supporting the robustness of our results. 
In Column (4) we investigate the sensitivity of the results of our baseline model 
using a different definition of specific risks, bank size, capital, concentration and level 
of economic development. Specifically, we measure: 1) credit risk as the ratio of non-
performing assets to total assets, 2) liquidity risk as the ratio of total deposits to total 
assets, 3) growth risk as the percentage of assets growth in the year immediately prior to 
the financial crisis, 4) bank size as the natural logarithm of total assets, 5) capital as the 
capital adequacy ratio Tier 1, which represents the ratio of Tier 1 Capital to total risk-
weighted assets, 6) concentration in the banking industry as the fraction of assets held 
by the three largest banks in each country and 7) level of economic development as the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita, based on purchasing power parity. Estimation 
results are very similar to the baseline model thus, suggesting that our results are 
scarcely affected by the use of alternative variables. We note that only the coefficient on 
the Board independence variable loses statistical significance, but the coefficient on the 
CEO duality variable is now statistically significant.  
Additionally, in unreported regression we replicate the estimation in Columns (2) 
and (4) using Foreign variable instead of the IIBIS variable and we arrive at similar 
conclusions. 
 
                                                 
154 Stijn Claessens and Neeltje van Horen, ‘Foreign Banks: Trends, Impact and Financial Stability’, De 
Nederlandsche Bank Working Paper No. 330, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1977446> or 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1977446 > (visited 8 November 2014) (2011). 
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4.2.3 Introducing additional control variables 
As a new step we augmented the baseline model by introducing additional bank-
level and country-level control variables. First, we want to confirm that our main 
conclusions hold when additional control variables are accounted for. Second, we 
intend to test whether the existence of a board audit committee, the supervision and the 
regulation in the banking sector affect the likelihood of a bank being bailed out. 
Controlling for differences in national policies provides not only a simple robustness 
test but it is also independently valuable as countries implement regulations to promote 
stability. 
Table 5 presents the results. 
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Table 5 – Determinants of bailouts with additional control variables 
The table presents the results of the probit regressions used to predict the probability of bailouts in the 
European banking sector in the context of the financial crisis, including additional control variables.  
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Board independence 0.021* 
(0.099) 
0.026** 
(0.040) 
0.014  
(0.130) 
0.024* 
(0.062) 
Board size 0.053 
(0.358) 
0.025 
(0.679) 
0.089  
(0.126) 
0.047 
(0.496) 
CEO duality 0.400 
(0.711) 
-0.496 
(0.609) 
-0.355 
(0.728) 
-0.334 
(0.727) 
Board experience -0.202*** 
(0.001) 
-0.291*** 
(0.000) 
-0.114** 
(0.016) 
-0.196*** 
(0.001) 
Director tenure -0.639*** 
(0.006) 
-0.703*** 
(0.001) 
-0.450*** 
(0.002) 
-0.609*** 
(0.005) 
Board busyness 1.252*** 
(0.009) 
1.692*** 
(0.000) 
1.079** 
(0.000) 
1.390*** 
(0.002) 
Credit risk 1.127*** 
(0.001) 
1.320*** 
(0.000) 
1.053*** 
(0.000) 
1.256*** 
(0.001) 
Liquidity risk 0.010** 
(0.019) 
0.012** 
(0.020) 
0.005 
(0.122) 
0.011** 
(0.030) 
Growth risk 0.004 
(0.380) 
-0.004 
(0.381) 
0.003 
(0.363) 
0.001 
(0.910) 
Bank size 0.243 
(0.445) 
0.541 
(0.149)  
-0.046 
(0.860) 
0.154 
(0.654) 
Capital -0.296* 
(0.089) 
-0.248  
(0.170)  
-0.031 
(0.800) 
-0.213  
(0.177)  
2006 performance 0.031 
(0.194)  
0.055  
(0.170)  
0.016 
(0.426) 
0.041* 
(0.065) 
Institutional ownership 0.001 
(0.928) 
8.99E-05 
(0.993) 
-0.008 
(0.500) 
-0.011 
(0.394) 
CG committee -2.861*** 
(0.001) 
-3.322** 
(0.002) 
-0.289 
(0.694) 
-2.270*** 
(0.009) 
Audit committee -2.055** 
(0.037) 
--- --- --- 
Concentration 0.115*** 
(0.000) 
0.098*** 
(0.000) 
0.064*** 
(0.007) 
0.076*** 
(0.008) 
IIBIS 0.036*** 
(0.000) 
0.029*** 
(0.001) 
--- 0.029*** 
(0.000) 
GDP per capita -3.768*** 
(0.008) 
-4.182*** 
(0.003) 
-4.755* 
(0.099) 
-4.372** 
(0.003) 
Official index --- 0.244 
(0.221) 
--- --- 
Financial freedom --- --- 0.059*** 
(0.010) 
--- 
Freedom corruption --- --- --- 0.030 
(0.459) 
N 53 53 53 53 
Bailed out/ Not bailed out 23/30 23/30 23/30 23/30 
% correct 84.91 84.91 77.36 83.02 
LR statistics 37.907 
(0.004) 
37.327 
(0.005) 
28.906 
(0.035) 
36.213 
(0.007) 
Pseudo R2  0.523 0.515 0.398 0.499 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at the 
1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels, using a two-tailed test. 
Please refer to Appendix 1 for the definition of each variable. 
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In Table 5, Column (1), to account for the impact of the existence of a separate 
audit committee, we also include the Audit committee variable, which is a dummy 
variable with a value of one if the bank has an audit committee and zero otherwise. We 
conclude that, similarly to Seema Miglani, Kamran Ahmed and Darren Henry,155 the 
coefficient on the Audit committee variable is negative and statistically significant. The 
existence of an audit committee, as well as the existence of a corporate governance 
committee, decreases the likelihood of bailouts. This finding is consistent with the 
argument of John J. Forker156 that the presence of an audit committee enhances board 
monitoring quality and attenuates agency costs. We note that the coefficient on the 
Capital variable is, now, negative and statistically significant. 
Next we account for differences in bank supervision and regulation. In 
Column (2), we add to our baseline model the official supervisory powers index, 
Official index variable, which is an index of the power of the country’s commercial 
bank supervisory agency. We find that the coefficient on the Official index variable is 
not statistically significant and that our results are robust to the introduction of this 
additional control variable.  
Further, alternatively, in Column (3), we include the variable Financial freedom, 
which is an indicator of the general openness and regulatory framework as it contains 
elements like openness to foreign competition and the extent of government regulation 
of financial services. Also, we note the potential overlap between the IIBIS and the 
Financial freedom variables, yet we do not include them at the same time. The results 
are not very different from the baseline model. Regarding our main variables, the 
coefficients on the Board independence and Liquidity risk variables are now not 
statistically significant. Also, we find that the coefficient on the Financial freedom 
variable is positive and statistically significant, indicating that fewer restrictions on 
banking freedom and greater openness increase the likelihood of bailouts. Thus, our 
results suggest detrimental effects of financial freedom. Banks are able to operate more 
freely and to engage in different and risky activities, far beyond their core activities. 
Also, the data points to the presence of contagion effects.  
                                                 
155 Seema Miglani, Kamran Ahmed and Darren Henry, ‘Voluntary Corporate Governance Structure and 
Financial Distress: Evidence from Australia’, 11 Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics 18 
(2015). 
156 John J. Forker, ‘Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality’, 22 Accounting and Business Research 
111 (1992). 
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Lastly, in Column (4), we check the extent to which our results might be driven 
by corruption differences in countries. The estimation results corroborate our findings 
for the baseline specification. Also, the coefficient on the Freedom corruption variable 
is not significant at the conventional levels. Thus, as Mara Faccio, Ronald W. Masulis 
and John J. McConnell, 157  the level of corruption is not statistically significant in 
explaining the likelihood of a bailout.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Governments intervened massively and repeatedly to support banks during the 
financial crisis in order to ensure their survival. Due to the uniqueness of banks and 
their impact on the stability of the financial system, several rescue programmes were 
adopted. Given the tremendous and costly bailout packages worldwide, the analysis of 
the determinants of the likelihood of banks being bailed out is of the utmost importance, 
namely in the process of reforming the financial regulation, the weaknesses of which 
were revealed by the global financial crisis. The results of our study therefore have 
relevant public policy implications. Overall, our results show that a set of characteristics 
of the board, bank risks and control variables have predictive power in explaining the 
probability of bailouts. Specifically, banks with more experienced boards, longer tenure 
and less busy supervisory directors are less likely to be bailed out. So, strong emphasis 
should be placed on the analysis of the board of a bank. On the other hand, both credit 
risk and liquidity risk, as well as the country-specific banking sector factors, 
concentration and international exposure, increase the likelihood of a bank participating 
in a bailout programme. These qualitative findings are unchanged in all regressions. 
Also, in the baseline model, board independence, performance prior to the financial 
crisis, the existence of a corporate governance committee and the level of economic 
development, measured by GDP per capita, have predictive power.  
Additionally, we first examine the impact of the existence of an audit committee 
and, second, the impact of the supervisory and regulatory environment variables. We 
find that the existence of an audit committee and the index of financial freedom are, 
                                                 
157  Mara Faccio, Ronald W. Masulis and John J. McConnell, ‘Political Connections and Corporate 
Bailouts’, 61 The Journal of Finance 2597 (2006). 
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respectively, negatively and positively associated with the likelihood of bailouts. These 
findings are consistent with the idea that the presence of an audit committee strengthens 
board monitoring and reduces agency costs and that greater freedom, acting as a 
contagion channel of shocks, has a detrimental effect. 
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Appendix 1 – Variables definitions 
Variables Definitions Measurement period Data sources 
Bank bailouts A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is bailed out any time over the 
period from July 2007 to December 2008 and 0 otherwise. 
July 2007 to December 2009 European Comission 
website; Bank’s official 
website; Annual Reports; 
Google website 
Board independence Percentage of independent directors, that is, the number of independent 
board directors on the board divided by board size. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
Board size Total number of directors serving on the board of the bank. December 2006 BoardEx 
CEO duality A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman, 
0 otherwise. 
December 2006 BoardEx; Annual Reports 
Board experience Supervisory directors’ average years of experience in the banking 
sector. To track banking experience we examine each supervisory 
director’s biography as provided in the BoardEx database. First, we 
compute the number of years each supervisory director has worked in 
the banking sector and sum all these years. Second, we divide this total 
by the number of supervisory directors on the board of the bank. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
Director tenure Average length of time, stated in years, that the supervisory directors 
have been on the bank’s board. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
Board busyness  Average number of board positions (number of directorships) held by 
supervisory directors. 
December 2006 BoardEx 
 
Credit risk Non-performing loan ratio, calculated as non-performing loans to total 
loans; Alternatively, non-performing assets ratio, calculated as non-
performing assets to total assets. 
December 2006 Datastream 
Liquidity risk Loan-to-deposit ratio, that is, total loans divided by total deposits. 
Alternatively, ratio of total deposits to total assets, that is, total deposits 
divided by total assets. 
December 2006 Datastream 
Growth risk Market-to-book ratio, that is, ratio of the market value of equity to the 
book value of equity. Alternatively, percentage of assets growth in the 
year immediately prior to the financial crisis. 
December 2006 Datastream 
Bank size Natural logarithm of the bank’s market capitalisation. Alternatively, 
natural logarithm of the bank’s total assets. 
December 2006 Datastream 
Capital Bank capital, computed as the ratio of total equity to total assets. 
Alternatively, capital adequacy ratio Tier 1, which represents the ratio 
of Tier 1 Capital to total risk-weighted assets, calculated in accordance  
December 2006 Datastream 
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Appendix 1 – Variables definitions (cont.) 
Variables Definitions Measurement period Data sources 
Capital (cont.) with banking regulations and expressed as a percentage December 2006 Datastream 
2006 performance Buy-and-hold stock returns. January 2006 to December 2006 Datastream  
Institutional ownership Percentage of shares owned by institutional investors. December 2006 Thomson Financial 
CG committee A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank has a corporate governance 
committee, 0 otherwise. 
December 2006 BoardEx; Annual Reports 
Audit committee A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank has an audit committee, 
0 otherwise. 
December 2006 Datastream 
Concentration Measure of concentration in the banking industry. Assets of the five 
largest banks as a share of total commercial banking assets. 
Alternatively, assets of the three largest banks as a share of total 
commercial banking assets. 
December 2006 World Bank website158 
IIBIS Measure of the degree of international integration. Ratio of 
consolidated foreign claims to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the 
banks that are reporting to Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
December 2006 World Bank website159 
Foreign Percentage of the number of foreign owned banks to the number of the 
total banks in an economy. A foreign bank is a bank where at least 
50% of its shares are owned by foreigners 
December 2006 World Bank website160 
GDP per capita Natural logarithm of GDP per capita. Alternatively, natural logarithm 
of GDP per capita, based on purchasing power parity 
December 2006 World Bank website161 
Official index The official supervisory powers index measures the degree to which 
the country’s commercial bank supervisory agency has the authority to 
take specific actions. It is composed of information on many features  
2007 (revised June 2008)162 World Bank website163; James 
R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr. 
and Ross Levine 164  
                                                 
158 Global Financial Development Database, available at <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development> 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
162 We use data as close as possible to the financial crisis. 
163 Survey of Bank Regulation and Supervision carried out by the World Bank, available at: 
<http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20345037~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00
.html#Survey_III> 
164 James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Ross Levine, ‘Bank Regulations Are Changing: For Better or Worse’, 50 Comparative Economic Studies 537 (2008). 
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Appendix 1 –Variables definitions (cont.) 
Variables Definitions Measurement period Data sources 
Official index (cont.) of official supervision: 1. Does the supervisory agency have the right to 
meet with external auditors about banks? 2. Are auditors required to 
communicate directly to the supervisory agency about elicit activities, 
fraud, or insider abuse? 3. Can supervisors take legal action against 
external auditors for negligence? 4. Can the supervisory authority force 
a bank to change its internal organisational structure? 5. Are off-
balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? 6. Can the supervisory 
agency order the bank's directors or management to constitute 
provisions to cover actual or potential losses? 7. Can the supervisory 
agency suspend the directors' decision to distribute: a) Dividends? b) 
Bonuses? c) Management fees? 8. Can the supervisory agency 
supersede the rights of bank shareholders-and declare a bank insolvent? 
9. Can the supervisory agency suspend some or all ownership rights? 
10. Can the supervisory agency: a) Supersede shareholder rights? b) 
Remove and replace management? c) Remove and replace directors? 
The official supervisory index has a maximum value of 14 and a 
minimum value of 0, where higher values indicate greater power. 
2007 (revised June 2008) World Bank website165; James 
R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr. 
and Ross Levine166  
Financial freedom Indicator of financial and banking freedom specifically, whether 
foreign banks are able to operate freely, whether the government 
influences allocation of credit, how difficult it is to open domestic 
banks and other financial services firms, to which extent the financial 
system is regulated, the presence of State-owned banks and whether 
banks are free to provide insurance and securities services to 
customers. The index ranges from 0 to 100, with high values signifying 
more freedom and thus fewer restrictions. 
December 2006 Heritage Foundation 
website167 
Freedom corruption Indicator of freedom from corruption. Values range from 0 to 100, with 
higher values indicating lower levels of corruption. 
December 2006 Heritage Foundation 
website168 
                                                 
165 Global Financial Development Database, available at <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development> 
166 James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Ross Levine, ‘Bank Regulations Are Changing: For Better or Worse’, 50 Comparative Economic Studies 537 (2008). 
167 <http://www.heritage.org> 
168 Ibid. 
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